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What follows is the contents of Logos-Sophia, volume 11 (Fall 2001), which contains the
manuscript of Charles Hartshorne’s Letters to a Young Philosopher: 1979-1995, edited
by Donald Wayne Viney. The pagination of the original journal issue is indicated in
square brackets. The photo of Hartshorne on the cover of the journal was taken by Don
Viney on March 23, 1985 in St. Louis, Missouri. The color photos reproduced here on
pages 59 and 60 were originally printed in black and white. The original journal issue
included an index, but since this is an electronic document, it can easily be searched so
there was no need to include the index in this version.
Donald Wayne Viney
September 19, 2016
Pittsburg State University
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[1] Introduction
The Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society is pleased to present the
eleventh volume of its journal, Logos-Sophia. This issue of the journal breaks the
precedent of all but one earlier issue in being devoted to a single theme. It is a
commemoration of the founding of the Society in 1987 and it is published in memory of
Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000). In April 1987 a small group of students accompanied
Dr. Viney to Central State University in Edmond, Oklahoma to hear Professor Hartshorne
present a paper titled “God as Composer-Director and Enjoyer, and in a Sense Player, of
the Cosmic Drama.” The presentation stimulated their thinking and inspired them to
found a philosophical society at Pittsburg State University. In the early records of the
Society, Hartshorne is listed as an honorary member.
Since its founding, the PSU Philosophical Society has remained true to its
objectives, as stated in its Constitution, “to promote philosophical activity at Pittsburg
State University by sponsoring speakers, supporting library acquisitions, addressing
philosophical questions through published writings by the members, and taking trips to
philosophical conferences” (Logos-Sophia, v. 6, Spring 1994, p. 77). The ongoing legacy
of the Society is the periodic publication of the journal, Logos-Sophia. Volumes were
published in Fall 1988, Spring 1990, Spring 1991, Spring 1992, Spring 1993 (Special
issue on Creation and Evolution), Spring 1994, Spring 1996, Spring 1997, Spring 1998,
Spring 2000, and now in Fall 2001.
In light of Hartshorne’s importance to philosophy, but especially of his role,
however unintended, in being the initial inspiration for the Society, the present members
of the Society deemed it fitting that this number of the issue be dedicated to him. The
members wish to offer a special thanks to Heather Hess for a generous donation that
made the publication of this volume possible. Thanks are also due to the PSU Office of
Academic Affairs for its assistance, especially Diane Hutchison, who designed the cover
of this issue.
Camilla North and Eric Dutton
Co-Presidents, Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society
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CHARLES HARTSHORNE’S
LETTERS TO A YOUNG PHILOSOPHER:
1979-1995

Edited by Donald Wayne Viney

[2] Between 1979 and 1997 I corresponded with Charles Hartshorne (18972000)—Hartshorne’s last letter was in 1995. I was just beginning my career and he was
in the final stages of his. For the first year and a half we corresponded because I was
writing my dissertation about his arguments for the existence of God and he was a
member of my committee advising me. In later years I continued to ask for his advice on
articles and reviews that I was writing. Although he would often mention his and his
wife’s health, and he once spoke of his dreams, the correspondence never dwelt on
personal matters—on one occasion I allowed myself a meditation on the death of one of
my dear friends.
The chief value of the correspondence is in Hartshorne’s letters. I never
considered myself a giant among philosophers and it is safe to say that my colleagues in
philosophy who know who I am share this opinion. Nevertheless, I was fortunate enough
to exchange letters with a giant among philosophers and so our letters may interest others
for the light they cast on Hartshorne’s life and philosophical interests. To be sure, the
letters touch upon staples of Hartshornean philosophy such as the importance of Alfred
North Whitehead, the ontological argument, and the rejection of classical determinism. In
addition, however, there are the following: a letter where Hartshorne explains why he
claims to know so little about God (November 12, 1991); letters outlining his knowledge
of and estimation of the French philosopher Jules Lequyer (May 21, 1986; July 9, 1988;
April 8, 1991; April 25, 1991); his estimation of his most important articles not appearing
in his books (see my letter of December 11, 1991); and there is a letter devoted to the
question of why we sleep (October 3, 1988). In the final analysis, the letters display a
mind that was philosophically acute into its eighth and ninth decades.
I made copies of all of my letters and I kept all of the letters he sent to me—
hence, the correspondence is complete. In the letter of November 26, 1988, Hartshorne
granted me permission to make the correspondence public. I have not, however, included
every letter. Where a letter was a mere formality I have placed a summary of the letter in
square brackets. In addition, I use ellipses to indicate material omitted; in a couple of
instances information about people still living is omitted, but in most cases the ellipses
indicate Hartshorne’s suggested corrections and typos in the chapters that I sent to him.
Finally, I have taken the liberty to fill out abbreviations (e.g. “argument” for “argmt”)
and to correct a few spelling and punctuation errors.
[3] In one instance the letters are printed out of chronological order—letters of
April 21, 1992 and May 6, 1992 are reversed for obvious reasons. All of Hartshorne’s
letters were sent from 724 Sparks Avenue, Austin, Texas 78705. With one exception, my
letters prior to February 1985 were sent from Norman, Oklahoma—the exception is the
letter dated July 25, 1981, sent from Albuquerque, New Mexico. After February 1985, all
of my letters were sent from Pittsburg, Kansas.
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Appendix I is necessary for an understanding of Hartshorne’s letter of April 21,
1992. Appendix II is a photocopy of one of Hartshorne’s letters. Appendix III is a tribute
I wrote and sent to Emily Hartshorne Schwartz, Hartshorne’s only child.
In his memoirs, titled The Darkness and Light, Hartshorne included a picture of
the two of us with the caption: With Donald Viney, a young philosopher who has written
a book on my arguments for God’s existence—hence, the name of this correspondence.
Donald Wayne Viney
Pittsburg, Kansas
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[4] Thanks to Donald Crosby, who introduced me to Whitehead’s metaphysics, I
first saw Charles Hartshorne at a conference in Denver, Colorado in April 1976 while I
was an undergraduate at Colorado State University.1 I did not meet him, however, until
November 1979 in Austin Texas. That encounter perfectly exemplifies Hartshorne’s
belief in the reality of chance as well as his gregarious personality. I was a graduate
student at the University of Oklahoma in Norman but I was in Austin to attend a
conference with my colleague Peter Hutcheson (now at Southwest Texas State University
in San Marcos, Texas). At lunchtime Peter and I searched for someplace to eat besides
the school cafeteria. After an exasperating hour of hunting for a place to park we returned
to the convention center—to the cafeteria. We happened to sit at a table adjacent to where
Hartshorne was eating. When the people at his table left, Hartshorne asked if he might
finish his meal with us. For the next half an hour he entertained us with philosophical
remarks and humorous anecdotes. As a result of that serendipitous luncheon, I began a
serious study of Hartshorne’s writings. I sent him a letter on December 3, 1979.

December 3, 1979
Dr. Hartshorne,
You probably do not remember me. We met in Austin last November at the
Southwestern Philosophical Society meeting where I had the good fortune of talking with
you over lunch. Our conversation inspired me to look more seriously into your writings,
(specifically, Creative Synthesis, Logic of Perfection, and Anselm’s Discovery). After
some reflection on the Ontological argument I wrote the following rhyme and thought
you might enjoy reading it.
Ontological Sonnet
for Charles Hartshorne
I said to myself as I began to sit down,
“What couldn’t God think if He were around?”
For anything God could not imagine you see,
could not be imagined by you or by me.
[5] He couldn’t imagine a noise with no sound,
nor could he imagine a square being round.
All of this says that, if God were no fiction,
not even He could conceive contradictions.
1
Donald A. Crosby is author of numerous articles on Whitehead’s philosophy. His books include
Interpretive Theories of Religion (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1981) and The Specter of the Absurd:
Sources & Criticisms of Modern Nihilism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988). He is
coeditor (with Charley D. Hardwick) of Religious Experience and Ecological Responsibility (New York:
Peter Lang, 1996). Crosby recounts his own philosophical-religious journey in “From Nature to God: A
Personal Odyssey,” Religious Humanism 25, 3 (Summer 1991): 107-116.
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But could God imagine Himself not existing
and the world without Him, merely subsisting;
the condition of all that is real or can be
floating in the abyss of nonentity?
This God could clearly never conceive,
and if He could not, then why you or me?
I hope some day I have the pleasure of meeting you again.
Sincerely,
Don Viney
*

*

*

[Written at the top of the letter] I may be tempted to quote your poem. How about that?
With your name? Or without?
Dec. 13, 1979
Dear Professor Viney,
Yes indeed I enjoyed your poem. By the way it is a verse form I’ve not seen, like
a sonnet in number of lines, but not iambic pentameter lines; also not a usual rhyme
scheme, and a few imperfect rhymes. But it skips along with spirit. And makes sense.
Long ago I wrote lots of poetry, and then stopped almost wholly. A mistake
perhaps.
Thanks. I hope we do meet again and I’ll keep your name in mind.

Charles Hartshorne

*

*

*

Feb. 19, 1980
Dr. Hartshorne,
I thank you for acknowledging receiving my “Ontological Sonnet”. You mention
the possibility of quoting the poem and ask if I would wish my name quoted with it.
Should you ever decide to quote the poem, please include my [6] name. Was it Cicero
who pointed out that even a philosopher who writes a book on humility is careful to sign
his name to it? I suppose I must plead guilty to this lack of humility. At any rate, I thank
you once again and am flattered by your comments.
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Sincerely,
Don Viney

[Late in 1980 I wrote a prospectus for my dissertation. My proposed topic was
Hartshorne’s ontological argument for God’s existence. Unbeknownst to me, in a letter
dated December 17, 1980, Professor Robert Shahan, chairperson for the department of
philosophy at the University of Oklahoma, sent Hartshorne a copy of the prospectus and
invited him to be a member of my committee. On January 11, 1981, Hartshorne wrote to
Shahan to accept the invitation. Hartshorne pointed out that, contrary to my claim in the
prospectus, there existed a book-length treatment of his ontological argument written by
George Goodwin.2 He added that he was just as interested in his five other arguments. I
took the hint and wrote the dissertation on Hartshorne’s global argument. On February
21-25, 1981, Hartshorne visited Norman and Oklahoma City and we spoke extensively
about my dissertation. Hartshorne wrote to me on the day after he returned home.]
*

*

*

Feb. 26, 1981
Dear Don,
The English theologian-philosopher with the “empirical” argument (version of the
design argument) was F. R. Tennant. I found his name by looking up God in W. R.
Reese’s Encyl. Of Philos. and Religion.*3 What a useful work! If your library doesn’t
have it it would do well to order it. Tennant died in 1953 aged 91. W. R. Sorley had an
argument for theism, a moral argument.
It was fine to have as much time as we had to talk.
Very cordially,
Charles Hartshorne
* Humanities Press Inc., 171 First Ave., Atlantic Highlands, N. J. 07716.
*

*

*

[7] March 9, 1981

2
George Goodwin, The Ontological Argument of Charles Hartshorne, (Missoula, Montana:
Scholars Press, 1978).
3
The correct bibliographical information is William L. Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy and
Religion.
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Dr. Hartshorne,
I want to say once again how much I enjoyed your visit to Norman. After having
read so much of your work it was a pleasure to meet the “man behind the work.” Our
conversations inspired me, and added a needed impetus to my dissertation project.
The paper you find enclosed is one I wrote for Dr. [Kenneth] Merrill last year. I
am seriously considering polishing it up and sending it to a journal for publication. I
would very much like to know what you think of it. After rereading it I realize it might
gain something from your idea that eternal necessities cannot be ugly.
While you were here I mentioned that I had found a short piece of yours not listed
in the Process Studies primary bibliography.4 The piece is a reply to [R. H., Jr.] Randall’s
review of Beyond Humanism. It is in the Journal of Philosophy, volume 35, n. 5, 1938,
pp. 131-133.
The Spring semester comes nearer to an end each day and I am still a bit unhappy
with the books I am planning to use in my intersession course on Process Theology. I
have forgotten the name of the fellow who coauthored the book with you entitled
Whitehead’s View of Reality. Would you mind relaying that information to me? The book
is so new it is not listed in the current Books in Print. I am wondering if the book might
be a good introduction to Whitehead’s thought for college juniors.
I am still planning to visit Austin (and my cousins) in the Summer. I’ll let you
know ahead of time. Perhaps we could talk over lunch.
Amicably yours,
Don Viney
*

*

*

[8] Mar. 14, 1981
Dear Mr. Viney,
I am very pleased by your essay. I found, and quite likely you have found them, a
few typos. . . .
Concerning adequacy. It is probably not relevant to polishing this essay, but of
course I hold in a way Whitehead did not clearly do, that the inadequacy of a Godless
philosophy is not an empirical but an a priori defect in that any conceivable personally
ordered experience would either be divine itself or would know its individuality to be
immortal or would face Whitehead’s problem, and even if it knew itself to be immortal
(the possibility of which I question) the problem of importance in the long run would still
be there in less obvious ways. It is not the special features of our cosmic epoch that set
the problem, as I see it. Of course too Whitehead’s argument that eternal possibilities
4

Process Studies 6, 1 (Spring 1973): 73-93. Presently, the most up-to-date bibliography is
“Charles Hartshorne: Primary Bibliography of Philosophical Works,” complied by Dorothy C. Hartshorne,
Revised and Updated by Donald Wayne Viney and Randy Ramal, Process Studies 30, 2 (Fall-Winter,
2002).
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must be somewhere is for me an a priori argument valid for any nondivine experience if it
is for ours. Metaphysical narrowness would be false in any possible world state, not just
in ours.
I found your essay readable and well argued.
Where to try to publish it? . . . [Hartshorne suggested Journal of Religion, Process
Studies, The Personalist, and American Journal of Theology and Philosophy.]
I’m sending you the new little book on Whitehead. I’m curious to find out if it
seems helpful? Somehow I’m too close to it to tell. It’s by me and Creighton Peden.
Do you like Cobb’s book on Whitehead? Or Lowe’s Understanding Whitehead?
Sincerely,
Charles Hartshorne

[On April 6, 1981 I responded and sent Hartshorne a copy of my revised prospectus. The
paper on Whitehead that I wrote was never published.]
*

*

*

Apr. 12, 1981
Dear Don,
I like your statement.
If in the idea of God essence and existence are one (though not essence and
actuality) then atheism must reject the idea of God even as possibly true. But then no
empirical argument for atheism (such as from the Problem of Evil) can be valid. This fits
nicely with the cosmological argument as I [9] develop it and the design argument. Not
the particular contingent world requires God to design or order it and thus make it
possible, but any possible contingent state of things requires God, and divine ordering
does not have the function of preventing all disorder or evil. Nor do the particular ethical
or aesthetic needs of humanity make divine preservation of achievements and enjoyment
of the world’s beauty necessary; rather any conceivable being able to put the question
would face the essential problem we face that requires God as solution.
Religious intuition seems to imply that the idea of a worshipful being makes
sense. But the other arguments try to show that if that idea does not make sense, neither
do our basic categories of necessity and contingency, order and disorder, good in the long
run and on the whole, all-inclusive beauty, or objective truth. In all these cases we seem
to find a necessity to assert both the essence and necessary existence of God as making
sense, and the nontheistic alternative as not making sense.
These are just some rather random thoughts. I think you can find your way to
some worthwhile points without much help from me. But I will be interested in your
results.
I’m about to go to Dartmouth to debate the question, should selective abortion be
made illegal? I find this a monstrous proposal and do not greatly enjoy the idea of a
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formal debate about it. But I think I am well loaded for the fray. Debating is a political
activity, not a search for truth. But it has some relation to such a search. I have materials
from the abortion rights group. Somewhat to my surprise 27 national religious
organizations favor the right to choose side. My opponent is a woman surgeon, perhaps a
catholic, Dr. Mildred Jefferson.
Best wishes.
Charles
[On the back of the letter]: As you are surely aware there is ambiguity in “empirical”.
Thus [John] Hick will, he hopes, confirm his belief by finding himself in heaven after
death. But he gives us no conceivable way in which it could be disconfirmed. (So the
scheme is not empirical, by Popper’s criterion.) His view relates to experience, but any
view that has meaning at all does that.
C. H.
*

*

*

[10] May 1, 1981
Dr. Hartshorne,
For the record I am sending you a copy of the dissertation prospectus which was
approved by the other members of my committee (Drs. [Ken] Merrill, [Francis] Kovach,
[Robert] Shahan, and [Tom] Boyd). The prospectus is a slightly revised version of the
one I sent you earlier.
My course in Process Theology will not be offered this Spring intersession
because of a lack of student interest (only seven people enrolled). I am a bit disappointed.
But now my time is free to prepare for our move to Albuquerque. My wife, Chris, has a
job there and I’ll work on my dissertation. We’ll return to Norman for the Fall semester.
As I mentioned in a previous letter, I may have a chance to make a brief visit to Austin. If
so, I’ll let you know beforehand. Perhaps I can hand you one of the chapters of my
dissertation in person.
How did the debate at Darmouth go? I suspect you “nailed them to the wall” if
you used the arguments in your recent article in The Christian Century.5 My experience
with debates of this sort, however, is that people are more inclined to be persuaded by
emotional appeals than by rational arguments.
Sincerely,
Don Viney

“Concerning Abortion: An Attempt at a Rational View,” Christian Century, 98, 2 (January 21,
1981): 42-45.
5
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*

*

*

May 4, 1981
Dear Don Viney,
Your prospectus reads nicely. I’m sorry you didn’t get many students. That
happened to me at Harvard the first year. I think I lost more by that than you will. But it
probably was not the main reason I didn’t get taken permanently into the department.
And I’m not sure I regret that anyway. In fact I don’t really.
Following A. P. Martinich, my colleague here, I interpret [John Duns] Scotus as
holding that all valid arguments for the divine existence are a priori. Franciscan Studies,
37 (1977), Annual XV. He might have a reprint for you. Department of Philosophy,
Austin, TX 78712.
[11] The other arguments than the OA [Ontological Argument] seem to show that
deity as defined exists without necessarily going through the OA. Or so I seem to recall
them but I’ve not gone into it afresh.
I incline now to put most stress on the simplest OA.
T for theism
1. T is logically possible, conceivably true.
2. If T is logically possible, T is necessarily true (its falsity is not conceivable).
3. Therefore T is necessarily true.
If the opponent questions (1) then he gives up empiricism. If he questions (2), then he
must suppose that, unlike all noncontroversially contingent propositions, T does not
affirm an existence having a conceivable cause or a conceivable beginning in time, does
not exclude any positive form of existence or particular finite quantity or degree between
zero and infinity, or assert any particular kinds or numbers of parts, etc. Thus, all the
criteria that render intelligible a distinction between possible and real existence are
lacking in this case. Also ordinary individuals are not identifiable by an a priori
definition, [but] God is. God is an exception to the rule, “existence is contingent and only
empirically knowable,” because the idea fails to meet any of the criteria that justify the
rule. Insisting that it applies to divine existence is merely question begging, all the more
since I can explain why this insistence occurs—failure to see the difference between
existence and actuality as I define these. All assertions of a particular concrete actuality
are indeed contingent.
One form of this simplified OA is in my essay on Hick in Idealistic Studies.6
Perhaps you have that.
I did not win the debate at Dartmouth and I did not debate well. I have never
debated formally and don’t like the combative, victory at any cost atmosphere. I did get
47 votes, or my side did, compared to 87, as I recall. My two students didn’t debate very
sharply either, whereas one at least of the other two did. But my students had more
The essay is in Religious Studies, 13, 2 (June 1977), pp. 155-165, titled “John Hick on Logical
and Ontological Necessity.”
6
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interest in the truth I am confident. The audience was packed with fanatics, not all
students either.
I have written an effective reply I think to letters to the Christian Century on my
essay. That way I may win.
Cordially,
Charles H.
*

*

*

[12] July 25, 1981
Dr. Hartshorne,
Please find enclosed the first completed chapter of my dissertation. I have also
written a little outline which will help place the chapter in the context of my overall
project. Two more chapters are in preparation. I should like to finish and defend the
dissertation by December. The progress of the next couple of months will determine how
reasonable this goal is.
As you know, I have been spending my summer in Albuquerque, New Mexico. I
have worked on the dissertation and my course for the Fall. My wife has worked for
Sandia Laboratories. Albuquerque is nice but we both look forward to returning to
Oklahoma in a couple of weeks. The move to New Mexico was so costly I did not have
the chance to visit Austin. Maybe another time!
Enough chit-chat. Have you read Barry Whitney’s “Process Theology: Does a
Persuasive God Coerce?” in Southern Journal of Philosophy 17, 1 Spring 1979? I have
some ideas about the article but would like to know what you think. I’ve been toying with
the idea that the laws of nature pertain to aggregates of individuals, not individuals
proper. While individuals may not properly be coerced, perhaps aggregates can. I’m still
not sure how well this view would fit with the admittedly statistical nature of natural
laws.
I’ll sign off for now. Take care.
Sincerely,
Don Viney
P. S. My cousin, who lives in Austin, gave me a copy of your letter to the editor on
creationism and science.7 I wonder how many of those advocating Biblical creationism as
a rival to evolutionary theory have seriously considered the relationships between
religion, philosophy and science.

7

See Austin American Statesman, Saturday, May 23, 1981.
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[Hartshorne responded on August 1, 1981. The letter is one page of suggested changes in
the wording of sentences in the chapter I had sent him on the ontological argument. On
September 14, 1981 I sent him my chapter on neoclassical theism and asked for a letter of
recommendation. I also reported having found a copy of his 1953 book Reality as Social
Process in Boulder, Colorado.]
*

*

*

[13] [postmarked September 17, 1981]
Dear Don,
I’ve sent [John] Biro a letter recommending you. I may supplement it when you
have finished your dissertation if this seems likely to improve your prospects. I certainly
want you to get a position.
Again, I have found little to say about your chapter other than that it is eminently
acceptable. . . .
I am a bit uneasy about the reference to Buddhism on p. 20, upper middle.
Reincarnation does not, I suppose, mean continuance of an individual’s consciousness
after death, but the question is tricky, especially if you take the Pure Land Buddhism into
account. If you have a Buddhist expert there you might ask him (or her).
There is perhaps some ambiguity in “the world is necessary” as you put it, though
the preceding and following pages should resolve the ambiguity. There must be some
world or other, but our definite world is contingent. This is perhaps not a flaw
considering the context you give the statement.
For the rest it is a flawless account of my view. I’m delighted to learn that I used
such a good metaphor as the one about nonidentical twins of risk and opportunity. I had
forgotten.
Your upbringing and education has given you a fine command of English
grammar. You are lucky. Many students have more trouble at that point. Keep up the
good work.
Charles Hartshorne
*

*

*

[In November 1981, I attended a philosophy meeting in San Marcos, Texas and saw
Hartshorne there.]
November 23, 1981
Professor Hartshorne,
What a pleasant surprise to see you in San Marcos! I am only sorry I did not have
a chapter of my dissertation for you. Well, here is a chapter [on cumulative arguments],
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even if I cannot hand it to you in person. I am presently working on your design
argument. The work is going smoothly.
I just received a bit of serendipity. My father is going to Harvard in January to do
some research on Dorthea Dix, an early Unitarian social reformer (you may know of her).
As a combined Christmas and Birthday gift, he has invited me to accompany him. I am
ecstatic. I’ve never been to Boston [14] and time at Harvard can be well spent in the
library working on my dissertation. This opportunity could not have come at a more
opportune time.
I hope you like the chapter. Have a good Thanksgiving and a Merry Christmas.
Sincerely,
Don Viney
P. S. I meant to ask you in San Marcos how the work on your latest book is coming.
*

*

*

Dec. 31, 1981
Dear Don,
Because of a serious illness of Mrs. Hartshorne’s, from which she is recovering
now, I have fallen behind in my correspondence farther than usual.
I’ve now read your Chapter 1 and find it acceptable. I’m pleased to have the
setting you give the question. It’s a long, long time since I read, so far as I did, [F. R.]
Tennant; I don’t know [Basil] Mitchell’s ideas either. [Michael] Scriven’s discussion I
did read with care some years ago and I told him why he hadn’t refuted me. [Antony]
Flew, [Edward] Madden and [Peter] Hare I more or less know. My colleague [A. P.]
Martinich has made me aware of [Duns] Scotus’s a priori view; I think he is the most
careful reasoner of the scholastics, and with Anselm the most creative. I’ve not read
[Richard] Swinburne.
There are a few verbal slips. . . .
If I limit my corrections to such trivialities this is partly because I am not a close
student of most of those you deal with.
I await further chapters with interest.
I spent about 7 ½ years at Harvard altogether. My last visit of any length was to
take a last look at Peirce manuscripts in the early Thirties. Perhaps my ghostly presence
will be almost detectable there.
C. H.

*

*

*
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[15] [On January 28, 1982, I sent Hartshorne my chapter on the design argument and
noted that on the trip to Harvard I obtained a copy of his dissertation.]
Feb. 2, 1982
Dear Don,
Again I have only minor points to make about your new chapter.
If you had read Chapter 3 of my next book you would know why I would scarcely
term Plato’s design argument crude. I think it was the best for two thousand years. This is
partly because of his idea that soul is self-moved, and that the plurality of souls explains
there being some disorder. Also Plato was the first to make use of the mind-body analogy
and he did well at it (Timaeus).
The account of the argument in Creative Synthesis is very brief and, I now think,
is one reason it has had so little attention. I don’t there but somewhere (where?) make the
point that it is value which explains power, so that supreme, cosmic power must mean
supreme value.* Hence the goodness of God is supported. The mind-body analogy can be
used here. Bad souls are not wholly bad, and their badness tends to undermine their
power over bodies. Wickedness is partly weakness, partly stupidity, and would not
explain cosmic and indispensable power.
I’m a little uneasy about the apparent symmetry of your discussion of empirical as
imply[ing] falsifiability and verifiability. ([Karl] Popper’s asymmetrical view here is
important for me as you know). Also we can know a non-empirical view is false if we
can see it as illogical. It is not observationally falsifiable, but is conceptually so if it is not
true.
I’m pleased by your quotation from [C. S.] Peirce about the knowability in
principle of reality.
Dorothy is getting better steadily in nearly all respects, perhaps in all. For several
days there seemed to be a backsliding in one respect but even that is reversed today, and
we are very encouraged.
Keep up the good work.
C. H.
* If A directly influences B it is because A derives value from B; the cosmic and
uniquely necessary and reliable form of this must be supremely valuable. Only indirect
power may not mean that the influenced derives value from intrinsic value in the
influencer. A gun gives power by extrinsic disvalue, if you see what I mean.
*
[16] February 8, 1982
Professor Hartshorne,

*

*
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I hope Mrs. Hartshorne’s illness has completely reversed. My daughter had a bad
cough last week but is now much improved.
Here is the chapter on the Cosmological Argument. I’m not sure, but it may be
my favorite aside from the moral argument. As you can see, I have adopted a new method
of recording references. To avoid an unmanageable list of footnotes I have put references
to your books in parentheses within the text.
Your observation that the brevity of the global argument in Creative Synthesis is
one reason it has received so little attention may be correct. Still, I have a suspicion that
too many philosophers are inclined to the method of convenient ignorance.
I am now working on the second triad of proofs. Your reference to [Alfred] Tarski
in the Epistemic argument has me puzzled. I take it you mean to accuse Tarski of begging
the question by assuming rather than explaining the relation between appearance and
reality. Can you tell me if I’m right on this. Or am I totally off base?
Sincerely,
Don
[Hartshorne’s response is written at the bottom of my letter. His envelope is postdated
February 13, 1982.]
*

*

*

Tarski’s “‘The grass is green’ is true if and only if the grass is green” explains
truth in terms of reality. It is assumed that there is green grass, that the word grass has a
referent. One may imagine purple grass, but this does not make ‘the grass is green’ true. I
don’t say that Tarski begs the question; he merely shows that the word truth refers to a
relation between thought and reality. The relation of reality to knowledge is a further
question that Tarski’s definition does not take up. I hold with [Josiah] Royce that
knowledge can be defined in terms of experience, and reality is what knowledge knows.
Infallible knowledge defines reality, and infallible knowledge (epistemic argument) is
defined in terms of the ideal form of experience (adequate, distinct intuition; or, as Royce
puts it, ideas adequate to percepts and vice versa). The correspondence of thought to
reality is internal to experience, relatively so in ordinary cases, absolutely so in the
unsurpassable or divine case. . . .
[17] P. 19, near bottom. Good point about ignorance!8
P. 22, middle. “Omnipotent” makes me nervous. As usually interpreted it is of
course an absurd notion if I am right. Unsurpassable power with universal scope is O.K.
but this is taken, as you know, to mean power unilaterally to determine events, thus
negating freedom of all but God. . . .
Dorothy is gaining but still not very strong.
8
Hartshorne was responding to my discussion of Brand Blanshard’s idea that contingency has
only an epistemic meaning but no ontological meaning. I wrote, “There is more to contingency than the
concept of ignorance can exhaust. Indeed, ignorance itself is understandable only in terms of contingency.
To be ignorant of something is to fail to know something that could be known.” See my Charles
Hartshorne and the Existence of God (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), p. 73.
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Charles Hartshorne
*

*

*

February 18, 1982
Professor Hartshorne,
I am delighted by your comments on Tarski. As a matter of fact, I think Tarski
would agree with you that his definition of truth does not settle the Roycean problem. I
include a quotation from one of his papers to this effect in the chapter on the Epistemic
argument, (footnote 4).9
I am sorry to burden you with two chapters this time, especially since Mrs.
Hartshorne is still convalescing. There has simply been more free time than usual and
I’ve tried to take advantage of the situation. Perhaps I’ll have a first draft of the entire
dissertation by mid-March. . . .
It goes without saying that your wife has my best wishes that she improve rapidly.
Sincerely,
Don
*

*

*

[18] Feb. 21, 1982
Dear Don,
You keep understanding me well. . . . [C]lassical theism made divine properties
not only different in kind but opposite rather than unsurpassable. Not supremely sensitive
and responsive but wholly insensitive and unresponsive (impassable). . . .
Dorothy keeps on slowly getting well. Never before with either of us has
convalescence been so slow. But the direction seems clear. I read aloud a lot to her and
we both enjoy it.
C. H.
*

*

*

March 2, 1982
9
Tarski says, “. . . we may accept the semantic conception of truth without giving up any
epistemological attitude we may have had; we may remain naïve realists, critical realists or idealists,
empiricists or metaphysicians—whatever we were before. The semantic conception is completely neutral
toward all these issues.” Alfred Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of
Semantics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (1944), p. 362.
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Professor Hartshorne,
Besides the introduction, I have only one chapter to go—the conclusion. The
enclosed chapters are my latest installment. You will notice that I have added a brief
chapter on preliminary considerations. . . .
I found a quote from the Latin American poet Jorge Luis Borges which I am
adding to the chapter on the Moral argument.
Events far reaching enough to people all space, whose end is nonetheless tolled
when one man dies, may cause us wonder. But something, or an infinite number
of things, dies in every death, unless the universe is possessed of a memory, as the
theosophists have supposed. (Dreamtigers, Univ. of Texas Press, 1964, p. 39).
I wonder if Borges sees that one needn’t be a theosophist to believe in a cosmic memory?
Anyway, he expresses the crux of the Moral argument nicely.
I hope to be teaching my course on Process Theology again this May. It all
depends on the number who enroll. I was disappointed to discover that [Eugene] Peters’
little book, The Creative Advance is out of print. I should like to have used it.
Has Mrs. Hartshorne recovered completely? If not, I hope her convalescence
doesn’t last much longer.
Sincerely,
Don Viney
*

*

*

[19] [On April 1, 1982 I sent Hartshorne a reading copy of my dissertation and
notification that the oral defense was scheduled for April 22nd. Hartshorne responded
with two letters.]
Apr. 5, 1982
Dear Don,
It turns out that I have to go to a place 100 miles East of here the 21st of April and
spend the night there. Probably it is best to leave the date of your exam as it is and
probably it is best for me not to try to come to Norman, even though it would be a fine
occasion. I have very warm feelings about your work. Tell the committee chairman that I
cordially recommend your dissertation. You have done a splendid job and what you do
does not duplicate what anyone else has done. I learned from your discussion of my
dissertation, for instance, much that I did not know. Also I shall have to look at
something I have written about Duns Scotus because of what you report about his view.
He comes closer to the cumulative view than I realized.
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I’m deep in publication problems with my next book, to be published by State
University of New York Press. . . .
Such insignificant flaws are about all I find.
Dorothy is almost well now, but I probably have enough to do without adding the
trip to Norman. But it would be a privilege to be there.
Charles
April. 5, 1982
Dear Don,
I don’t recall exactly how much you take into account, in considering the design
argument and what it proves, the aspect of necessity. If the divine existence is necessary
then divine power must be adequate to ensure this. A world orderer must have invincible
power to create and sustain some world plan or other. Add that the most intelligible
explanation of power, in a psychicalist philosophy, is the possession of worth, value,
beauty, charm, intrinsic goodness. In the case of divine power this must be infallible,
universally appealing. So I incline to think that the design argument either proves nothing
or a great deal.
The above is not a criticism of your dissertation, but merely something for you to
use, now or later, if it seems useful.
The theistic question is the question of unsurpassability, in one or both of the two
senses. Unsurpassable power, wisdom, goodness, belong together. This is why I disagree
with Mortimer Adler’s notion that we can prove a [20] supreme intelligence but not
supreme goodness or love. A supreme power or supreme intelligence that is not good or
loving (appreciative of the value of others) is not supremely powerful or supremely
intelligent, but in some way weak or stupid.
C. H.
*

*

*

[On April 9, 1982 I sent Hartshorne copies of the “approval page” for my dissertation for
him to sign and return. I also asked why Open Court would not be publishing his next
book. He replied with the following handwritten note.]
Apr. 12, ‘82
Dear Don,
With great satisfaction I’ve signed the approval forms.
Open Court was willing to publish Insights & Oversights. But I have other
designs on them. I also think SUNY will distribute the copies better. They can hardly do
better printing.
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Charles
Divine Relativity is now again available in paperback, with a beautiful cover.
*

*

*

[On May 27, 1982 I sent Hartshorne a bound copy of my dissertation and asked him for
another letter of reference, for I had a prospect for a job at East Central University in
Ada, Oklahoma. I also told him about a project that, at the time, my father and I were
working on concerning free will in psychological literature.]
June 8, 1982
Dear Don,
Thanks for your excellent dissertation. I am delighted to write a new
recommendation and pleased that you have a prospect in your state. I’ve written what I
trust is a strong letter—in your case not nearly as hard as it sometimes is.
Insights and Oversights will be published by SUNY Press at Albany. The final
manuscript has gone to Albany and they say they will go right ahead with publication.
My book on American Philosophy [Creativity in American Philosophy] is also
done and I’ll be considering where to send it perhaps soon. Open Court [21] would do it,
and so possibly would SUNY.
My book of recollections is also done [The Darkness and the Light]. I don’t want
Dorothy to have too much proof reading in the next year or so, and this is one reason I am
not in a great hurry.
Your project with your father sounds fine. I wonder if either of you knows
Marcus Ford’s University Press of America book on [William] James?10 He argues that
James was a psychicalist.
Charles
[On January 24, 1983 I wrote to Hartshorne to ask if he would write a foreword to my
dissertation if I could find a publisher for it. I also asked for his suggestions for likely
publishers. He returned my letter on January 31st, indicating in its margins that he would
write the foreword. He suggested State University of New York Press and University
Press of America. On February 18th I wrote to say that SUNY Press requested the
manuscript for review and that I had given the dissertation a new title, Charles
Hartshorne and the Existence of God. On April 1, 1983 my father and I attended the
meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology in Atlanta, Georgia.
Hartshorne was there and gave a paper on Leonard Troland (published in Process Studies
30, 2). My father and I had breakfast with Hartshorne and accompanied him to the
Atlanta airport.]

Marcus Peter Ford, William James’s Philosophy: A New Perspective (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1982).
10
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*

*

*

April 15, 1983
Dear Professor Hartshorne,
What a delight to see you again, this time in the lovely city of Atlanta. Your
paper on Troland was vintage Hartshorne, but I confess I more enjoyed lunching with
you and hearing the witticisms, anecdotes, and philosophical remarks for which you have
become so well known. Someone once told me that you are a national treasure. I now see
why.
Insights and Oversights arrived in the mail a few days ago and I’m already well
into the book. The chapter on Aristotle is especially nice.
I’ll be teaching my course on Process Theology again this May. The last time I
taught the course I used The Divine Relativity as an introduction to neoclassical
metaphysics. However, the book proved to be too much for many of the students so I’ve
switched to A Natural Theology for Our Time. When it is published I’ll probably use
Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes.
[22] My efforts at publishing remain in limbo. SUNY Press is still considering my
dissertation on the Global Argument. The suspense is unnerving. If they reject it I’ll
probably send it to University Press of America.
Hope you enjoy the enclosed photographs. My father sends his best and says he
felt very fortunate to have made your acquaintance. I share his sentiments.
Sincerely,
Don
[On May 6, 1983 I wrote to Hartshorne to report SUNY’s provisional acceptance of the
book and I renewed my request that he write the foreword. On July 29th Hartshorne’s
foreword arrived in the mail, without a letter. On August 16th I wrote to Hartshorne to say
that I had a final agreement from SUNY to publish; however, I explained that their
agreement was contingent upon Hartshorne’s foreword not appearing in the book. Of
course, I was distraught at having to write such a letter. The editors at SUNY had not
read Hartshorne’s foreword when they made the decision. I protested to the editor-inchief, William Eastman that the board of editors should at least read the foreword before
making a decision. Happily, the board reversed its decision and I wrote to Hartshorne on
October 8th with the good news. I also included in the letter a photocopy of the portrait of
Hartshorne by my artist friend Michelle Bakay that would be printed on the cover of the
book. I saw Hartshorne once again in mid-April 1984 at a conference in Lincoln,
Nebraska. On April 18th I wrote a brief note and sent him some photographs from the
conference. My next communication from Hartshorne was in June.]
*
June 14, 1984

*

*
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Dear Don,
Please let me know who is to publish your book? I can’t remember or find a letter
telling me. I want to refer to it. Probably published in 1984?
I am in fairly good shape. I hope you are in even better shape. Regards to your
admirable father.
Charles
[On June 20th I responded to remind Hartshorne that SUNY Press would publish the
book. On August 21st I wrote to Hartshorne again to say that I had been hired to a tenure
track position at Pittsburg State University in Pittsburg, Kansas. I gave him my new
address and said that I expected my book to be published by Christmas.]
*

*

*

[23] September 8, 1984
Dear Don,
Of course I am delighted by your new status.
We’ve just returned from our trip to Hawaii and Japan (Nagoya), where at each
conference (comparative philosophy and process philosophy) I was termed the “keynote
speaker.” I got an especially enthusiastic reception from the comparative philosophers. I
spoke on Sankara, Nagarjuna, and Fa Tsang with some Western Analogues.11 My health
is good, though I found traveling so far and to so many places (7 hotels in 25 days)
tedious and somewhat nerve-wracking, partly because Dorothy is only partly recovered
from a serious operation. She should complete her recovery soon now I hope.
It will be fine to have your book out. As you probably know my Creativity in
American Philosophy is now available. I have some fear that I’ve been publishing books
too fast, people will despair of keeping up with me.
I have two trips to make in November but can stay home until November 11th.
Cordial good wishes for your new academic life.
Charles
*

*

*

February 2, 1985
Dear Professor Hartshorne,

11

Published in Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy, eds. G. J.
Larson and Eliot Deutsche (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press): 98-115.
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I wasn’t sure whether or not SUNY sent you a copy of my book. In any event,
here it is. Aesthetically it is not what I had hoped—the little picture corners make it look
like a photo album—but otherwise I am satisfied. It came as an honor to learn that
Eugene Peters read and approved of the book.12 He must have read the manuscript shortly
before his death. I wish I could have known him.
[24] The first review of the book I’ve seen comes from a fellow in Maine. Perhaps
you know him, The Rev. Philip E. Devenish. He did the review for Theological Studies.
It is a brief, and not very critical, book report. I await more hostile critics.
Perhaps you know that I am in a tenure track position at Pittsburg State University
in Pittsburg Kansas. It is a humble beginning. However, in these times, one is thankful
simply to have a beginning in philosophy.
In the past few months, moving and adjusting to new surroundings have not
allowed me to be as productive as I would have liked. Nevertheless, I’ve managed a little
progress on the book with my father on the free-will problem. Maybe we’ll get that out
before too long.
Again, thank you for the advice, support and inspiration you have offered along
the road to publication. Your help and encouragement have been for me pearls of great
price.
Sincerely,
Don Viney
*

*

*

February 21, 1985
Dear Don,
Thanks for the book and the news of your new job. I’m glad to have 2 copies of
the one and to learn of the other. As President Mays of [blank space in letter] in Atlanta
said to me once, it is easier to go from something to something else than from nothing to
something. So you may end up somewhere else but at least [you] will have something.
Oh the news about you and your father is also good. You may have to read the book on
freedom SUNY is publishing by my colleague here Robert Kane.13 It is a bit dry in places
but very competent and has some original insights I don’t find in any other book. He
knows the history of the problem of causality and freedom as well as its present status in
the profession.

Eugene H. Peters (January 30, 1929 – May 13, 1983), author of The Creative Advance (1966)
and Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics (1970). It has always been a source of satisfaction to me that
I could, in some small measure, promote Peters’ reputation by contributing to Faith & Creativity: Essays in
Honor of Eugene H. Peters, eds. George Nordgulen and George Shields (St. Louis, Missouri: CBP Press,
1987).
13
Hartshorne mistakenly wrote “Robert Kant.” The book to which Hartshorne refers is Free Will
and Values (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985).
12
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[William] Eastman of SUNY made us a short visit. What a splendid charming
fellow he is. His one course with me (in Seattle) really got to him and he is still my
student in a fashion. A wonderful combination of ability and sweetness, with no false
pretensions of any kind, is in him. What luck to run into such a publisher! I remember
your father well. He’s another person it is good to know.
Charles
[25] Yes I know Devenish. He’s strong for our kind of philosophy. Catholic background
if I recall correctly.
*

*

*

[Rebecca Main (then my fiancée), Joyce Bestor (later Jenkins), Regina Kobak14 (later
Drew), and Debra Smith—all students from Pittsburg State University—accompanied me
to St. Louis, Missouri to attend a conference on Process Theology on March 22-23, 1985.
Hartshorne was the keynote speaker for the conference. The papers from that conference
were published in The Modern Schoolman, 62, 4 (May 1985). After the conference I
wrote Hartshorne and his wife Dorothy a letter.]
April 8, 1985
Dear Professor and Mrs. Hartshorne,
Enclosed are some of the photographs I took during the St. Louis conference on
process theology. The photo of the two of you is a little reminiscent of American Gothic,
not unflattering, but not quite flattering either.15
My students and I enjoyed the conference. In my philosophy of religion seminar,
we have been reading my book, and a couple of the students have read Omnipotence.16 It
was a once-in-a-lifetime experience for them to meet the genius responsible for so much
innovation in modern theology. We all came away from the conference intellectually
stimulated and emotionally charged. My only regret is that I did not submit a paper to the
conference.
Mrs. Hartshorne, over the past four years I have caught occasional glimpses of
you through your husband’s letters (once I think we spoke over the phone). It was a
pleasure making your acquaintance. I now see that your reputation for kindness and
charm is well deserved.
I look forward to meeting the two of you again.
Sincerely,
Don Viney
14

See my letter of April 19, 1991.
This photograph is reproduced in Process Studies 29, 2 (Fall-Winter 2000), p. 191.
16
Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: SUNY Press,
15

1984).
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P. S. [Leonard] Eslick and [Lewis] Ford are going to review my book. I have a special
admiration for Ford’s analytical abilities and am looking forward to reading his review.
[26] I thought you might appreciate George Eliot’s poem—a beautiful expression of
something besides conventional immorality. [I included a photocopy of Eliot’s poem
“Choir Invisible.”]
*

*

*

[On December 13, 1985 I sent Hartshorne a copy of my paper “How to Argue for God’s
Existence: Reflections on Hartshorne’s Global Argument,” which I described as a rehash
of part of my book and which would appear in The Midwest Quarterly 28, 1 (Autumn
1986): 36-49. I also told Hartshorne that I had applied for a job at Emory University.
Hartshorne responded with the following letter.]
[Written at the top of the letter] (I must either learn how to do it on my new typewriter or
stop using this narrow stationary.)
December 22, 1985
Dear Don,
I am of course delighted with your “rehash” of part of the dissertation. Your
writing has always been good but this essay is even better than what I have seen of you
before. Your summary of my argument will be the best in print.
On the design argument: against A1 [There is no cosmic order], as you know, I
would hold that not only is Astronomy as an observational science against it but any
conceivable science would be against it. No experience could show that there was no
cosmic order, if order allows for freedom in all agents. Any experience would be made
possible by an order in its past and would have no good reason to believe there would be
no order in the future. Trust in some degree of order is inherent in living.
Concerning the Library of Living Philosophers volume on my philosophy, I have
met with one difficulty, there is no psychologist to be a contributor.17 The few asked have
not seen their way to do it. One that seemed a possibility has, after a moderate time since
I wrote, not replied. He still might I suppose. I hesitate to put pressure on anyone in
psychology because my book on sensation is 41 years old and never succeeded in
interesting very many psychologists. My bird book has interested ornithologists.18 (I
knew better, [27] being much older, when I wrote that book than when I wrote the
sensation book how to write for specialists in a subject outside philosophy.) The bird
17
The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn. Library of Living
Philosophers, volume XX. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991).
18
Hartshorne was looking for a psychologist to write on his first book, The Philosophy and
Psychology of Sensation (University of Chicago Press, 1934). The other book to which Hartshorne refers is
Born to Sing: An Interpretation and World Survey of Bird Song (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
Press, 1973).
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book was, in its main concern, a study of animal behavior with the idea that behavior
indicates feelings, and at least some slight memory of the past and sense of the future.
I have two essays that summarize the main point about bird song that you may or
may not have. Is there any chance your father would be interested? The idea is not to
praise but to evaluate my work so far as it bears on experimental or empirical facts.
Probably your father already knows from you that I take psychology to be the universal
science, so far as active agents “acting as one” are concerned. With the understanding,
however, that the farther from the human type of animal one goes, through cells, atoms,
and farther, the less can one do much with the more than merely behavioristic side. Also
multi-cellular plants are not single agents, only their cells, this being the difference a
nervous system makes with animals.
You perhaps have some idea of your father’s interests. He might be merely
embarrassed by such a suggestion. I admire him and his relation to you. Probably he
should not be bothered. I can live with there being no psychologist in the book. But I
would like even a severely critical one. There is a man who likes Born to Sing, [Lucio]
Chiaraviglio, former student, trained as an engineer, expert on artificial intelligence and
on Whitehead, and who is to write for the volume on my philosophy, taking the bird book
into account and also an essay of mine on “Thinking About Thinking Machines,”
published, alas, where neither philosophers nor psychologists would see it (Texas
Quarterly, [7, 1] Spring 1964 [pp. 131-140]).
Born to Sing has received a good deal of attention from ornithologists, much of it
favorable. No reviewer accused me of not knowing the literature (“he has certainly read
about these birds”), nor have I been accused of factual mistakes save in one statistical
point on which a leading expert takes my side.
Merry Christmas,
Charles
[On January 13, 1986, I wrote to Hartshorne to say that I had conveyed his request to my
father and I gave him my father’s address. I mentioned my work on the philosopher Jules
Lequyer19 and that I was beginning to think about finding a publisher for my book The
God of Process—a book I partially wrote but never published. On January 22nd I wrote
again to request a letter of reference to be sent to William Alston to attend Alston’s 1986
NEH Summer Institute in Philosophy of Religion. I also asked whether Hartshorne had
found someone to write on his sensation book for the LLP volume.]
*

*

*

[28] January 30, 1986
Dear Don,

“Lequyer” is the official orthography, although “Lequier” is also common and is the spelling
used by Hartshorne and which I adopted until after 1994.
19
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I’ve written [Lewis] Hahn to ask your father to write for the LLP volume. And
Hahn writes me he has done this. I’ve found a copy of my sensation book that I can send
him if he needs it and am waiting to hear from him. I wrote to him before hearing from
Hahn but Hahn was quite willing to include him, though he says the list is about full.
Hahn also wrote my ornithological choice and I’ve written him too. So it seems possible
that almost all my main concerns will be covered though I would have like an expert
historian or two like [Gregory] Vlastos or [Richard] Popkin. But one can’t have
everything. Glad to hear all you’re doing.
Charles
*

*

*

May 19, 1986
Dear Professor Hartshorne,
I am writing to thank you for your reference, and to let you know that I was
accepted as a participant in Alston’s Institute for the Philosophy of Religion in
Bellingham Washington in July 1986. I look forward to hobnobbing with other
philosophers whose minds are in the same state of confusion as my own (to borrow a
phrase from Proust).
I have enclosed a paper on Lequier on omniscience which I read earlier this year
at the Kansas Philosophical Society. I don’t know yet where I’ll send it but I need a piece
of historical information from you: When did you first learn of Lequier? The first
reference I find to Lequier in your writing is 1949, “Chance, Love and Incompatibility.” 20
Of course, long before this you’d come to your present position on omniscience.
Thanks for your help.
Sincerely,
Don
P. S. My father tells me that his paper for the LLP volume is coming along well! He
seems impressed by the extent to which your work is confirmed by current research and
attitudes.
*

*

*

[29] May 21, 1986
Dear Don,

20

Published in Reality as Social Process (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1953): 85-109.
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I am delighted you are working on Lequier. Also pleased to see once more how
good and readable your writing is. Finally I am happy to hear how your father feels about
his study of my psychological views.
Your “earliest” of my references to Lequier may very well be the earliest. For I
first began looking into Lequier after Jean Wahl in Paris, where he had me give two
lectures (the same in two places in Paris) either late in 1948 or early in ’49, told me that,
considering what I had said in my lecture, I should read Lequier. I probably got my
incomplete edition of Lequier in Paris at that time. How right Wahl was!
[Hartshorne here suggested slight revisions in my paper]
Various journals might publish your essay. . . . [Hartshorne suggested, Journal of
the History of Philosophy, American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion, The American Philosophical Quarterly, The Review
of Metaphysics, and International Philosophical Quarterly.]
Charles
*

*

*

August 28, 1986
Dear Professor Hartshorne,
Here is a copy of my article on your theistic arguments. There is also a review of
Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes on page 144.21 For some reason the editor
hyphenated your last name Hart-shorne, despite my examples in the original draft.
I have just read my father’s article on your psychology. I think it is a fine piece.
He told me that your book has changed some of his thinking. “Some of the ideas in that
book have used me,” he said. In particular, he has been taken with the idea that so much
of the early psychologies were pre-evolutionary. If evolution is true then one would
expect continuity rather than discontinuity among the various senses. In his view, your
book was years ahead of its time.
Here’s hoping that you and yours are doing well.
Sincerely,
Don
*

*

*

[30] September 3, 1986
Dear Don,

“How to Argue for God’s Existence: Reflections on Hartshorne’s Global Argument,” The
Midwest Quarterly 28, 1 (Autumn 1986): 36-49; the review of Omnipotence in the same issue is on pages
144-146.
21
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I like your father’s essay very much. I expected to like it from the time he agreed
to do it.
So far, with 13 contributors, I am not unhappy about a single one.
I also like your essay in The Midwest Quarterly. Very lucid and readable.
Dorothy has broken her shoulder bone. We’re doing as well as to be expected, in
that situation. Friends are helping us and we have some Home Care from our local
hospital. Our morale holds up.
Charles
*

*

*

[On April 7, 1987, Hartshorne visited Central State University in Edmond, Oklahoma
where he gave a talk titled, “God as Composer-Director and Enjoyer, and in a Sense
Player, of the Cosmic Drama” (published in Process Studies 30, 2, Fall-Winter, 2002). I
took several students to Edmond to hear Hartshorne speak. Afterwards I wrote him a
letter about a response I was considering writing to a review of my book in Process
Studies (15, 3; Fall 1986, pp. 207-212) by Eric von der Luft. I included detailed questions
about Professor Luft’s review. In the same letter I enclosed an article I had recently
published, “William James on Free Will and Determinism,” The Journal of Mind and
Behavior 7, 4 (Autumn 1986): 555-566. As is apparent from Hartshorne’s response, he
was much more interested in James and the question of freedom than he was in my
concerns about Professor Luft. Nevertheless, I eventually published the rebuttal, “In
Defense of the Global Argument: a Reply to Professor Luft,” Process Studies 16, 4
(Winter 1987): 309-312.]
[Handwritten at the top of the letter] If they ask me I’ll certainly back you at Emory
May 13, 1987
Dear Don,
Now that I’ve really read your W. James article I want to tell you how pleased I
am with it. It ought to do a lot of good. I have tended to neglect what James’s other
discussions of freedom added to “[The] Dilemma [of Determinism].” (Hereafter DT)
Your article gives this addition admirably. Good research indeed.
You can probably guess how I differ somewhat from James. DT convinced me by
itself that determinism cannot be true of human actions. And years later C. S. Peirce’s
“[The] Doctrine of Necessity [Examined]” convinced me, virtually by itself, that
determinism is not true of any part of nature, if “effects” are taken in their full
concreteness. Determinism forces us to go beyond nature to find any meaning for the idea
of unrealized possibilities, and thus we have to choose among the following: a
particularly bad kind of supernaturalism (as in Spinoza) which rejects such possibilities
and hence takes ‘necessary’ to express no genuine contrast and therefore (principle of
contrast) to lose its meaning, or a weird cosmic or supercosmic dice thrower, or the
notion of deity as having genuine causal freedom in supreme degree, although no being
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other than God has such freedom to the least degree! Moreover, the division of nature
into the really free in a few spots, but wholly unfree everywhere else is a conceptually
bizarre, unappealing dualism. With [Karl] Popper, [A. N.] Whitehead, and [Albert]
Einstein I reject positivism as a scientific stance. A minimum of metaphysical
commitment is required for the best empirical work. Determinism taken as metaphysical
truth served science well in some ways until recently. Now, since [Werner] Heisenberg,
scientists find they can do better without it. Einstein’s metaphysical determinism
hampered him in his last decades. I think James was wrong to ask psychology to be
neutral on this issue. And now that physics finds that its laws may all be statistical only,
why pretend that psychology, vastly less precise in its measurements, needs to demand or
expect more order in nature than physics does? I think it should expect less. If Peirce,
well before quantum theory, could accept the statistical view of cosmic order, and if C.
Maxwell, still earlier, could do so (as he strongly hints he did), what is the point of still
trying to take the Newtonian stance in 1987?
On p. 557 of your essay, 17 lines up from the bottom, you say rightly that
determinism and indeterminism are contradictories not contraries. Your next sentence
raises the issue I discuss above. Peirce’s indeterminism held that no events (in their full
specificity or concreteness) are necessitated. Freedom is a matter of degree, and nature is
a vast hierarchy of such degrees, divine freedom being the highest, and particles or atoms
being the lowest. On this planet we are almost certainly the highest, with apes and whales
next.
Epicurus was the first to take freedom as universal in nature. Peirce was almost
certainly influenced by him, as [Max] Fisch has shown, though he is less sure about this
than I am. Maxwell seems to take the same view. Crucial of course is the Leibnizian
distinction between singular and composite. Only animals, among visible things in nature,
taken as single wholes, act as one, or have freedom. Not plants but only plant cells act as
one. Since composites do not act, but only the dynamic singulars in them, they are neither
free nor unfree, and neither sentient nor insentient, except trivially the latter. All action
by the really acting agents has above zero freedom, and involves at least [31] feeling.
This Peirce-Whitehead position that Leibniz logically ought to have taken but could not
(and no one could at that time) is easy enough to take now.
However the main message of this letter is, keep up the good work!
[Unsigned]
*

*

*

[On June 3, 1987 I sent Hartshorne a copy of my rebuttal of Professor Luft and I thanked
him for his remarks on my James paper. I saw Hartshorne again on February 11-13, 1988
in Austin, Texas at a conference given in his honor on the occasion of his ninetieth
birthday and in celebration of the coming publication of the LLP volume, The Philosophy
of Charles Hartshorne. Robert Kane, the organizer of the conference invited me to write
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a paper on Hartshorne’s views on omniscience to be included in the volume of papers to
be published from the conference.22]
June 5, 1988
Dear Professor Hartshorne,
The enclosed photographs were taken while you were in Edmond, Oklahoma in
April 1987. Several of my students accompanied me to Edmond to hear you speak. They
were so energized by your talk that they returned to Pittsburg and formed the Pittsburg
State University Philosophical Society. Early next Fall, volume 1 of the Society’s student
journal will be published (one of the articles is a critical appraisal of Wisdom as
Moderation). Much of their enthusiasm for philosophy is attributable to your influence.
The photographs and the button are an expression of gratitude for helping philosophy
“come alive” in the imaginations of my students. Pittsburg State University’s mascot is
the gorilla, hence, our Society’s logo of the gorilla contemplating the skull.
I am anxious for you to see my contribution to Bob Kane and Stephen Phillips
(eds.) Hartshorne, Process Philosophy and Religion. The paper I am writing is entitled
“Hartshorne on Omniscience.” I would like one piece of information from you. To what
extent, if any, did [Jules] Lequier’s work influence your ideas in “The Meaning of ‘Is
Going to Be’” Mind 74, (1965)? Lequier says,
. . . between contingent past things and contingent things to come there is this
difference: of two contradictory affirmations concerning contingent past things,
one is true, the other false; but of two contradictory [33] affirmations concerning
contingent things to come, neither the one nor the other is true, both are false
(Œuvres complètes, 194).
Lequier’s view is not far from your own. Had he identified the affirmations concerning
the future as contraries rather than contradictories he would have said what you said in
the Mind article. As you note, “definitely X” and “definitely not X” do not exhaust the
logical possibilities; one also needs “indefinite with respect to X”. As a point of historical
interest, did Lequier’s ideas on this point influence your own?
WITH FOND REGARDS,
Don Viney
P.S. A belated happy birthday!
*

*

*

July 9, 1988
The paper was published as “God Only Knows? Hartshorne and the Mechanics of
Omniscience,” Hartshorne, Process Philosophy and Theology, eds. Robert Kane and Stephen Phillips
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989): 71-90.
22
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Dear Don,
Thanks for your fine photos. I hope your father is flourishing.
The news about your students is most pleasing.
About Lequier, I agree with your analysis of the close similarity of my views on
past and future and Lequier’s. I am not aware of being definitely influenced by Lequier
on that point. I have known for a long time that he was one of the fair number who see
time as modal, the past being necessary condition for the possibility of the present but the
future as not in concrete detail necessary consequence of the present, or the present of the
past. But my own adoption of this standpoint was settled still earlier, I think, by
[William] James, [C. S.] Peirce, and [Henri] Bergson. Whitehead and others, including
[John] Dewey, [Émile] Boutroux, [Charles] Renouvier, still others, including Lequier,
confirmed or encouraged me, but my mind was already, I think, made up. I read Lequier
only after Jean Wahl told me, in 1948, that I ought to read him, seeing that my views
were similar. Then [Harvey] Brimmer, who translated Lequier, after being my student at
Emory, made me (about 1960) very aware of Lequier’s work. If he influenced me
appreciably it was in what he said about God as the one who has “created me creator of
myself,” thus closely anticipating Whitehead’s “self-created creatures.”
Lequier’s greatest influence was through Renouvier to James, and through James
to Dewey, in making clear the connection of freedom (as creativity) with chance, setting
limits to what even ideal or divine decisions can determine, and making causal
indeterminacy almost axiomatic for later French metaphysics. But do not forget that
[René] Descartes started France in that direction by insisting on real freedom for human
persons. No other tradition, least of all the British, has been so resistant to the
deterministic tendency of [34] early modern thought. What helped us to do better than the
British was perhaps chiefly the accident of James’s and Peirce’s great genius but also, at
least a little, the forthright candor of the genius Jonathan Edwards in (long before)
arguing sharply, though fallaciously, for determinism. This challenge could not be
ignored. There was immediate counterargument. How far, if at all, this historical
background influenced Peirce, James, or Dewey I do not know, but it may have had some
more or less indirect influence. The British and the Germans faced no such clear
challenge, especially not the British. Their anti-metaphysical bias made them weak
against determinism, which is one of the great metaphysical mistakes and needed
opposition on the metaphysical level. The Anglo-idealists were little help in this regard.
They substituted teleological for blind causal necessity. And [J. S.] Mill and [David]
Hume professed determinism, as did [Herbert] Spencer. [John] Locke and [George]
Berkeley are unclear. A strange record for the great proponents of political freedom.
However, they (or some of them) were also great imperialists and believers in social
castes, a place for everyone and everyone in his largely inherited place. Our millionaire
and billionaire families, plus slavery and its legacies, threaten to reintroduce caste (if we
ever really got rid of it). I’m never sure if we have taken the ideal of equality of
opportunity even half as seriously as we should take it.
More power to you.
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My health is good. Dorothy’s is tolerable, though in some ways sad. She keeps up
her spirits and her wonderful sense of humor. Her fifty-five years of doing the household
chores easily reconcile me to doing many of them now.
Charles
I look forward to your essay.
*

*

*

[On August 25, 1988 I sent Hartshorne a copy of my contribution to the Kane and
Phillips volume. I also mentioned that one of my father’s colleagues, Professor Frank
Vatano was using some of Hartshorne’s ideas from Philosophy and Psychology of
Sensation (1934) in some short films he was making which were to be distributed
nationwide for use in psychology classes.]
August 27, 1988
Dear Don,
I am happy about your essay (nice research!) and also about your letter and the
words from your father and about Vatano. Quite exciting. I find no errors in your paper.
Aug. 12-18th I was in Oxford where two groups of philosophers, with some
overlap, met successively to discuss first theology-and-philosophy, then [35] social
philosophy.* Plenary session speaker of the first group was yours truly, of the second
group Robert Solomon, my colleague here. Met quite a few new-to-me people, mostly
American, with a few English and Scotch. My paper got cordial responses. An interesting
time.
You don’t say whether you’ve said anything to W. Viney about my solution of the
why we sleep problem.23 Combining the budgeting of energy and the Freudian
wishfullness idea might do most of the job. I keep having anxiety dreams that are not
about my chief real anxiety (my wife’s health)** or the secondary one, so many
unfinalized publications, but which on waking are, if anything, encouraging. The “only a
dream” realization is rather comforting. “At least I don’t have that reason to worry!” I
don’t recall much of what Freud says about this.
You’re right that I have not gone into [Luis de] Molina. Thanks for having done it
for me!!
When I began to be chronologically old I began to wonder, “When will the world
begin to dismiss me as an old fogey?” I don’t see it happening as yet.
The best to you and yours.
Charles
* Organized by Creighton Peden and his Highland Institute.
23

When I saw Hartshorne in April 1987 in Edmond, Oklahoma, we discussed, among other things,
his ideas on why we sleep and I remarked that my father would be interested in these things.
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** D.’s health is still sufficiently good for our joint needs and happiness, since mine is so
very good. She can still spot misspellings and mispunctuations that I miss.
*

*

*

Sept. 23, 1988
Dear Professor Hartshorne,
The enclosed paper will be published in Bob Kane’s and Steve Phillips’
Hartshorne, Process Philosophy, and Religion [sic.]. You read an earlier draft of the
paper. Although I had to cut it down a bit, it is basically the same paper as you read.
Steve said that he and Bob had given you the other papers that will appear in the volume,
but that mine was not among them. He asked that I send you my paper so as to complete
the set.
I spoke with my father a few days ago and he expressed interest in your idea of
why we sleep (although he said he is not “up” on the most recent literature). When I tried
to explain your idea I realized that I had a pretty [36] flimsy grasp of the theory,
especially the relationship you see between dreaming and conserving energy. My father
and I would both appreciate it if you would jot down the outlines of your ideas.
Here’s hoping that you and Dorothy are remaining healthy and that the anxiety
dreams you mentioned in your last letter are less frequent or have stopped altogether.
WITH FOND REGARDS,
Don
*

*

*

[Postmarked October 3, 1988]
Dear Don,
About sleep. My primary point, an obvious one to a biologist, concerns not
dreams especially but sleep, the relative immobility and consequently small expenditure
of animal energy. This energy comes from food (combining with oxygen), and food is
acquired through foraging, which expends energy. Add the great difference between
night and day, nocturnal and diurnal conditions, implying that animals specialized for
either of the two situations, alternating each twenty-four hours, are not likely to function
very efficiently in the other. Eyes adapted to bright light function ill in near darkness, and
not at all in total darkness. (Owls and lemurs have huge eyes enabling them to do well
nocturnally, but full daylight troubles them.) If, then, animals were wide awake day and
night they would be spending much more energy and have to find much more food, and
part of this finding would be done inefficiently. It would not be cost-efficient. It has
become commonplace in studies of bird behavior that a species must optimally “budget”
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its energy to be most successful. It does this by using one extreme of light-dark for active
pursuits, obtaining food, finding mate, and feeding offspring—in many mammals mostly
by mothers—and, during the other extreme, the one for which it is not specialized—
economizing its energy expenditure. How better do this last than by sleeping? Note too
that it is at night that sleeping, or being maximally relaxed, is the safest from predators.
Considering also the importance of sight, to which daylight is favorable, it is not
surprising that most species are diurnal. (Even the nightingale is diurnal essentially.)
None of the foregoing seems to depend on the function(s) of dreaming. Freud and others
have given us some reason to see certain values in that. But deep sleep itself is obviously
the most economical of energy.
In view of the foregoing, I am amazed to read about psychologists who say they
“do not know why we sleep.” The traditional view that we do it to recover from fatigue
misses the main point. We do it to avoid wasting precious energy which must be obtained
inefficiently. True, our command of fire and electricity, scientific agriculture, etc., etc.,
alters things, but our genes do not [37] yet “know” about this.* On the whole we still
function best in daylight. George (?) Wald, a distinguished physiologist, surprised me by
declaring that “we do not even know why birds sing most at dawn.” I think I may have
managed to convince him that we do know. Some birds sing a lot in the evening and
some a good deal on moon-lighted nights. Dim light is a safer time, so far as predators are
to be feared; above all, it is the time of day when foraging is not yet or no longer efficient
for diurnal species; moreover, since sound travels at least as well then as later in the day
it is an efficient time to phonetically advertise territory or attract a mate. Q.E.D. We
(some of us) do know.
Cordially,
Charles
* [Hand written note] I’ve not thought out what is involved in applying the theory to
civilized human beings. [Typed] It is important that time spent sleeping is not wasted.
Cells which have died can be replaced, digestive processes completed; because the cortex
is less active, waking or beginning to dream means a fresh start and, since thoughts and
experiences of the previous day can be partly recalled and seen in a new perspective,
given the new perceptions (even in dreams there are some, as Bergson has shown) the
variety, the contrasts that furnish the aesthetic richness of life are enhanced.
*

*

*

November 9, 1988
Dear Professor Hartshorne,
This letter is to request your permission to allow public (primarily scholarly)
access to our correspondence over the past several years. I intend to donate our
correspondence to the special collections of the University Library here at Pittsburg State
(I wrote to the Center for Process Studies and never received a reply). The

37
correspondence would be put on OCLC, a nationwide computer network, making it
available to scholars across the country.
With Fond Regards,
Don
P.S. I sent a copy of your letter detailing your views on why we sleep to my father. He
says he is not familiar with current studies on sleep but sees nothing wrong with your
ideas. My own feeling is that your views would need to be supplemented by the idea that
sleep is necessary, not merely for physical but also for emotional (and perhaps cognitive
stability). Aside from conserving energy, sleep may be important for a fully integrated
personality—note that sleep deprivation is a method used by some religious cults for
purposes of indoctrination and control.
*

*

*

[38] November 26, 1988
Dear Don,
I agree that sleep probably has the function you mention as well as the ones I
emphasize.
I have no objection now to your making a collection of our correspondence. It is
conceivable that the Center for Process Studies or someone wanting to write about me
may wish to see it but I leave that to the future. Rita Brock at Stephen’s College in
Missouri has some idea of writing a biography, or of editing my recollections if I do not
finish the job. I’m not sure how much time the world should be spending on details of my
career. My published writing itself is so complicated. Whitehead told his wife to destroy
everything he had not already published. And there was almost no correspondence. He
was a modest man for a great genius. It’s true I have been more of a letter writer than is
usual nowadays.
Philosophers and scientists seem to interest the general public as letter writers
rather little on the whole compared to poets or fiction writers. True I am a poet and story
writer manqué. I knew I would be a writer well before I knew I would teach philosophy,
or teach anything.
Charles
*
January 6, 1989
Dear Professor Hartshorne,

*

*
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The enclosed paper, “Does Omniscience Imply Foreknowledge? Craig on
Hartshorne” is a response to William Craig’s critique of your views on omniscience in a
recent issue of Process Studies. Lewis Ford suggested that I send the paper to you, as it is
some time before PS can publish it. Any comments you may have would be appreciated.
The paper somewhat overlaps my contribution to the Kane & Phillips volume,
which you have already read. At Kane’s suggestion, I expanded the critique of Craig into
another (i.e. this) paper.24 Frankly, I really enjoyed writing this piece, but found it
difficult not to be a bit sardonic. If you were not so well known, I might have thought that
Craig had read another Hartshorne, so inaccurate is his presentation of your views!
[39] Here’s hoping your 1989 will be productive.
WITH FOND REGARDS,
Don
P.S. Thank you for your generous permission to allow public access to our
correspondence.
*

*

*

January 9, 1989
Dear Don,
Beautiful! Your [Charles] Dickens quote is perfect. There was a master of
language. Will and May are nicely distinguished in ordinary speech.25
I have one emendation in punctuation. . . .
Part of the trouble is in the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Will he “accept the
proposal?” Suppose he will; there are many ways he may actualize his acceptance. He
may nod his head, say O.K., and so on. Concretely these are different events or small
sequences of events. That he will somehow accept may be much more definite than just
how. Language cannot fully identify the concrete, apart from direct acquaintance. The
hypnotist may have predetermined that the person will open the window, but not just how
and just when, or by exactly what motions; also what reason will he give, or not give, for
opening it. The hypnotist cannot possibly determine the concrete happenings.26 Unit
events, Whitehead’s actual entities, have to be past for our references. Only God could
make absolute predictions. Clerk Maxwell rejected determinism as meaning absolute
predictions given absolute knowledge of the past or present on the ground that only God
could have absolute knowledge of the past or present (or of anything concrete). I add that
no human language could express what he would then know.
See William Lane Craig, “Process Theology’s Denial of Divine Foreknowledge.” Process
Studies 16, 3 (Fall 1987): 198-202. My rebuttal was published as “Does Omniscience Imply
Foreknowledge? Craig on Hartshorne.” Process Studies 18, 1 (Spring 1989): 30-37.
25
The quote is from A Christmas Carol. Scrooge asks the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come, “Are
these the shadows of the things that Will be, or are they the shadows of the things that May be, only?”
26
Hartshorne wrote, “The hypnotist cannot possible determined the concrete happenings.”
24
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Happy New Year.
Charles
*

*

*

[40] January 9, 1990
Dear Professor Hartshorne,
Last year about this time I sent you a pre-publication copy of the enclosed article.
I received off-prints from Process Studies just the other day and thought that you might
like a copy. Craig has read the article and he agrees that my exposition of your views is
more accurate than his. However, he insists that my clearer exposition only serves to
show how “evidently fantastic” your views are. He believes that you evade the issues by
redefining central concepts like “future tense statement,” “Law of Excluded Middle,” and
“Bivalence.” Apparently my exposition was not so clear as to disabuse him of this
particular misconception. It seems to me that your suggestions on how to understand
future tensed propositions mark the first real advance on the subject since Aristotle. By
conceiving indefiniteness as a predicate one simultaneously preserves the indeterminacy
of the future (so dear to Aristotle) while retaining the law of excluded middle (which
Aristotle compromised). I know of several philosophers who followed Aristotle’s lead
(most clearly, Lequier), but I know of none until you who offers the kind of solution
found in your writings. Perhaps you have some precursors but I don’t know them.
I am anxious to see the Library of Living Philosophers volume on your work but
it is slow in being published. Also, I saw an advertisement for the book that Santiago Sia
edited (similar to the LLP volume) but it is priced so that few will be able to afford it,
including me—$99.00!27 I am rather peeved at the publisher.
My best to you and yours.
WITH FOND REGARDS,
Don
*

*

*

[On March 29, 1991 I sent Hartshorne a bibliography I compiled on 40 books about God
and reviews I wrote of his Wisdom as Moderation and The Darkness and the Light.28 I
asked if he knew how to obtain a copy of his article, “Thoughts on My Life, from the
Bilingual Journal, Lecomte du Nouy Association, 5 (Fall 1973) which I was having
Charles Hartshorne’s Concept of God: Philosophical and Theological Responses (Hingham,
Massachusetts: Kluwer Publishers, 1990).
28
The bibliography, “Oh God! Forty Books on God’s Existence, An Annotated Bibliography” and
the review of Wisdom are in The Practice of History and Social Science 26 (Spring 1991): bibliography, pp.
6-15; review, pp. 16-20; the review of Darkness and Light is in The Midwest Quarterly 32, 3 (Spring
1991): 366-368.
27
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difficulty locating. I also mentioned [41] that my work on studying and translating
Lequyer was continuing and that I was planning a sabbatical leave for this purpose. The
following letter indicates that Hartshorne had forgotten that he had already told me about
Harvey Brimmer’s work (see letter of July 9, 1988).]
April 8, 1991
Dear Don,
Thanks for your communication. The two reviews are, to use a phrase of a former
newspaper columnist, whose name escapes me, Fair Enough. I have no quarrel with
anything you say, even “disquieting.”29 I have somewhat shirked the ethical side. I tend to
think the final principle is the “category of the ultimate,” or sympathy (feeling of feeling),
love aiming at happiness of self and others. I can read this into many great philosophers,
Plato and Whitehead being the earliest and the latest, with some in Asia. Your letter puts
me in two difficulties. I don’t know how to find that Come de Noui [sic.] essay and, and
the question of translating Lequier has the complication you perhaps don’t know that
there already is a rather complete translation, but that I can’t seem to find it and even
forget the man’s name. He has a French wife who helped him with the French30 . . . Have
you noticed where I refer to such a person[?] He was my student at Emory, from whose
philosophy department I can probably recover the name. I have no reason to think his
translation is not good. It’s possible I let someone from [the] Center for Process Studies
take the translations. I think Emory gave X a Ph.D. . . .
Two documents of Lequier, as I recall the matter, were translated by X, one being
a dialogue and other an attempt to redo Descartes’s method of doubt to establish what is
really certain. Both defended freedom and change in God & us. I found the dialogue the
better of the two. The other seemed to me somewhat boring.
I think there is no problem of copyright. There was only a neat typed and bound
copy but not any publication.
How all this bears on your project is the question?
Sorry to be so forgetful. I barely manage to keep up. Lucio Chiaraviglio tells me
that with age our brains lose many cells. I can still think and write philosophically, but
less easily and rapidly.
[42] The only hint from memory that comes to me for X is Bruner [“Bruner”
scratched out], but no other part of the name. You may know. At last I have the name,
Harvey Brimmer. That doesn’t tell us where the copy is. But it is the right name, I’m
sure.
Charles
In my review of Wisdom I wrote, “Hartshorne’s vision [of God] is disquieting. He says,
‘Ultimately we are but contributory values . . .’ (Wisdom, p. 90). This seems to deprive fragmentary
existents of any intrinsic worth. Hartshorne claims that ‘intrinsic value consists exclusively in what an
existent does for God’ (Wisdom, p. 119). However, this sounds like a restatement of the problem. How can
intrinsic worth be tied to any ulterior purpose? (The former Governor of Kansas once said, ‘There is
intrinsic worth in having a four-lane highway for economic development’).”
30
Jacqueline Delobel.
29
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P.S. At last! Two heavy volumes of typing by Brimmer, his dissertation, under Paul
Kuntz, 1975, Emory. The two translations are all in volume 2, 166 & ½ pages singlespaced typing. Volume 1 is an elaborate introduction and then an account of the two
documents to be translated, partly by brief citations in English and partly by paraphrase.
The long introduction is partly historical, starting with Aristotle. Full name: Harvey W.
Brimmer, II.31 Doubtless Kuntz could tell you more than I can. I seem to recall technical
questions about the time limit in his getting his degree; suddenly I recall being there for
the oral, and watching him do fairly well in the oral. So I think he got the degree. Paul
would know. Incidentally I’m getting really fond of Kuntz, also his wife Marian. They’re
both knowledgeable scholars. She discovered an Italian Postelo (or Postel) who had a
position like that of F. Sozzini.
What else should I do about this?
I was impressed by your 40 books about God. Some names were new to me,
others only too familiar.
*

*

*

April 19, 1991
Dear Professor Hartshorne,
I appreciate your warning me about Harvey Brimmer’s translation of Lequier, but
as you can see from the enclosed material, I have known of that translation for some
time.32 . . . .
I will end on a personal note. Last week (April 8th) a very dear friend of mine was
murdered by her estranged husband. He shot her and then took his own life. She was 40
years old. She was a Methodist minister in Denver—Regina Drew. Her body was
returned here to Pittsburg for burial. In 1985 Regina came with me and three others to
hear you speak in Saint Louis. There [43] she met you and Dorothy, an experience that I
know she cherished, for she held you in high regard. Thereafter she spoke fondly of
having met “Chuck and Dotty” (her terms of endearment for you and your wife). My wife
and I have grieved her loss. The reason I am telling you this is that I am learning first
hand the practical side of process theology. I have never resolved the issue of whether
there is a personal survival of death (I blow hot and cold on that question). However,
there is a curious kind of comfort in not having to explain Regina’s tragedy in terms of
God’s providence—as if an omnipotent deity could not have created a world with at least
as much goodness as ours without allowing (or planning?) Regina’s murder. Like you, I
have no truck with divine power conceived in that way. I do not believe that omnipotence
as traditionally conceived has anything of value to offer one wounded by grief. In
31

The dissertation is titled Jules Lequier and Process Philosophy. The appendix to the dissertation
contains Brimmer’s and Delobel’s translations of Lequyer’s The Problem of Knowledge (pp. 291-354) and
of his Probus, or the Principle of Knowledge (an alternate title for The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the
Reprobate) (pp. 362-467).
32
I enclosed my translation of part of Lequyer’s Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate.
My complete translation of the dialogue appeared in Translation of Works of Jules Lequyer (New York:
The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998).
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addition, process theology allows one to accept that God shares in our suffering (the
fellow sufferer who understands, as Whitehead says). Finally, there is healing power in
the faith that God helps us rebuild our lives after the loss of a loved one. I am not sure if
theology can, or should, do any more than enable us, with logical consistency, to face an
uncertain future with the confidence that life is worth the effort. I know for a fact that
Regina accepted this kind of thinking, and that too consoles me.
Fond Regards,
Don
*

*

*

[After this letter from me, I received two letters from Hartshorne, one in April and one in
July 1991]
[Postmarked April 25, 1991]
Dear Don,
Are you sure Brimmer is still alive? They would know at Emory.
I like your brief translation. Something like that with his other long and in part
somewhat boring essay might be good.
Lequier was the first to say so explicitly* that we are not mere creatures and God
is not mere creator; we not only create ourselves to some extent but in doing so create
something in God. Except for generalizing self-creativity to include creatures as such one
already has Whitehead’s category of the ultimate. Peirce took that step with his tychism
but did not work it out well to include God. Like Whitehead he thought of God as
“disembodied.” Bergson did not quite do what almost obviously needed to be done but he
did say that the past is fully real, and so did Peirce. “The past is what is actual.” James
was superb on human freedom, but could not decide what to do about the rest of nature,
partly because he misunderstood [Gustav] Fechner, or just did not read the great chapter
in Zend-Avesta on “God and world”; also because, until [44] Quantum physics, science as
a whole seemed to demand determinism ([Willard] Gibbs, [Clerk] Maxwell were I
imagine not among James’s readings) and Fechner’s indeterminism was not quite sharp
enough and his form of panpsychism was the wrong form (trees, the earth; as “active
singulars” (my phrase), sentient as wholes).
All these people were needed to make process theism.
Charles
* Lequier knew, Jean Wahl told me, that the Socinians clearly implied it.

[Postmarked July 29, 1991]
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Dear Don,
I just came upon your review of Omnipotence in the M’West Q’ly. Don’t know if
I’ve mentioned it to you before. . . .33 As to mystery, the categories I use are so abstract
that they leave a great deal unsaid and perhaps unsayable. Important in this context is my
acceptance of Whitehead’s infinite succession of cosmic epochs only one of which we
can know much about. So far as the physico-chemical laws are contingent we can know
only those of our epoch. And even of ours we do not know how far the presence of higher
forms of mind than those constituting atoms and molecules would cause qualifications of
the physico-chemical laws. [Eugene] Wigner worries about this; [Henry] Stapp tries to
solve this. The basic mystery may be in our inability to think, feel, know, or love as God
does these things. Our thinking is so dependent on language that we have trouble
imagining or remembering how babies think; God must think without having to do so
with language, except in so far as knowing our thinking would bring language in.
Another consideration is that much of our thinking is our effort to make up for the radical
limitations of our direct perceiving, and our narrow attention span. I recall [Richard]
Rorty’s saying that theism has to assume that there can be a genuine analogy between
thinking with and without language. My only way of definitely “solving” that problem is
to say that for divine intuition every actuality is a sign of numerous others, whether as
iconic or as indexical (via prehensions as effects intuiting their own causes and possible
effects). This is a generalization of the language idea.
Anyhow thanks for your review. My health is still fine. I’ve written some essays,
several rather short, for various purposes. My big philosophical jobs may be about done.
If I do another book, it might be in ornithology, focusing primarily on song but writing
less for ornithologists and more for ordinary [45] educated people. I’m pleased by a
cordial letter from Lucio Chiaraviglio about my response to him about Born to Sing.
[Schubert] Ogden has done a nice review of Darkness and Light, in Theology
Today for July.
Lots of Good wishes,
[Unsigned]
*

*

*

[On August 1, 1991 I sent Hartshorne my review of God, Values, and Empiricism: Issues
in Philosophical Theology, eds. W. Creighton Peden and Larry E. Axel (Macon, Georgia:
Mercer University Press, 1989), a book that contains an essay by Hartshorne.34 On
September 29, 1991 I saw Hartshorne when I traveled to Claremont, California to attend
the celebration of the LLP volume by the Center for Process Studies. I sent another letter
to him on October 16, 1991 with photographs from the Claremont conference. I also
informed him that I would be publishing a review of the LLP volume in The Midwest
Quarterly—a journal on which I sit on the editorial board—and I requested that he
submit a paper to appear in the same issue with my review. In a package postmarked
33
34

125-126.

Hartshorne here remarks on Martin Gardner (cf. letter of November 12, 1991).
Review published in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 32, 2 (October 1992):
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October 19, 1991—no letter included—Hartshorne sent his essay “Can Philosophers
Cooperate Intellectually: Metaphysics as Applied Mathematics,” which was published in
The Midwest Quarterly 30, 1 (Autumn 1993): 8-20. My next communication from
Hartshorne was in a package postmarked November 12, 1991 which included a brief
handwritten note and the paper “Thomas Aquinas and Three Poets Who Do Not Agree
With Him.” Attached to the paper with a sticky-note was another handwritten note that
said, “How do you like this? If too long, take out something, but preserve the
intelligibility.” I understood Hartshorne to be submitting the paper to The Midwest
Quarterly, which I did on his behalf. Perhaps he had forgotten that he had already sent
me a paper for publication. In any event, the second paper proved a bit too lengthy for
MQ. I was unwilling to edit it, even with Hartshorne’s permission and instruction to
“preserve the intelligibility.” The paper was eventually published in Process Studies 30,
2. (Fall-Winter 2002).]
[46] [Postmarked November 12, 1991]
[No salutation]
Concerning M. Gardner & my knowing too much about God, what he & so many miss is
that what I claim to know is very little.35 The mystery is not what extreme abstractions
apply to God, but what the divine life concretely is, how God prehends you or me or
Hitler, or the feelings of bats, ants, plant cells, atoms. The one “to whom all hearts are
open knows, or loves the concrete concretely. We know nothing in that way. Also past
cosmic epochs.
C. H.
*

*

*

December 11, 1991
Dear Professor Hartshorne,
I have been invited to write the entry on you and your philosophy for the
Dictionary of Literary Biography on American philosophers since 1900. The article
should contain a list of your books and other important publications. Besides your books,
I intend to list the four volumes devoted to your philosophy in which you respond to
various contributors. In addition, your most important periodical publications that have
never appeared in your books should be mentioned. The following list is preliminary and
contains some of the articles that stand out in my mind as particularly significant. Are
there other articles that you consider especially important?
35
Hartshorne was probably responding to a statement in my review of Omnipotence and Other
Theological Mistakes (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), published in The Midwest Quarterly, 28, 1 (Autumn
1986): 144-146. I wrote, “Martin Gardner, the popular science writer and former student of Hartshorne,
says that it bothered him that Hartshorne always seemed to know so much more about God than he did.”
Gardner’s statement can be found in his The Whys of a Philosophical Scrivener (New York: Quill, 1983),
p. 251. See also Hartshorne’s letter of July 29, 1991.
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“Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics” (I and II) Journal of Philosophy,
volume 29 (1932).
“The Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument,” The
Philosophical Review, 53 (1944); and replies to William Elton in the same journal
(1945).
“The Meaning of ‘Is Going to be’,” Mind, 75 (1965).
[47] “Creativity and the Deductive Logic of Causality,” Review of Metaphysics,
27 (1973).
“John Hick on Logical and Ontological Necessity,” Religious Studies, 13 (1977).
“Concerning Abortion: An Attempt at a Rational View,” The Christian Century
98, 2 (Fall, 1980).
I never wrote to thank you for sending the articles for publication in The Midwest
Quarterly. Jim Schick, the editor, tells me that “Can Philosophers Cooperate
Intellectually: Metaphysics as Applied Mathematics” will appear in a 1993 number of the
journal. My review of The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne [will] appear in the same
issue.
One last question. You once told me that you had written a reply to the letters that
appeared in The Christian Century in response to your abortion article. Was that ever
published? Do you still have it?
Fond Regards,
Don
[Hartshorne returned my letter in December 1991 (date illegible). He had written notes on
the letter indicating additions to the bibliography and that he did not have his response to
The Christian Century letters. In the margins next to the articles I had selected, he wrote
“Good selection.” To the articles I listed he added “A Mathematical Analysis of Theism,”
The Review of Religion 8, 1 (Nov. 1943) and “Some Theological Mistakes and Their
Effects on Modern Literature,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 1, 1 (1987). On a
separate sticky note he wrote the numbers of items in the LLP bibliography that he
thought should be included: 7, 30, 34, 466-68, 476, 477, Born to Sing. Hartshorne also
included in the letter off-prints of two of his articles, “Hegel, Logic, and Metaphysics,”
CLIO 19, 4 (1990) and “An Open Letter to Carl Sagan,” The Journal of Speculative
Philosophy 5, 4 (1991).]
[My next letter to Hartshorne was on April 10, 1992. Hartshorne sent two replies to this
letter, one on April 21, 1992 and one on May 6, 1992. The first letter responded to the
essay that I had sent to him whereas the second letter was actually my original letter on
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which Hartshorne had written, responding in the margins to the particular questions I had
asked. He included in the envelope the table of contents of the book that he and
Mohammad Valady were working on, eventually published as The Zero Fallacy and
Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy (Peru, Illinois: Open Court, 1997). I include
here my letter of April 10th with Hartshorne’s annotations from May 6th placed in curly
brackets {. . .}]
[48] {This letter got mislaid. I did not answer it very well. A few essays come out soon, if
there’s time I’ll try to get you the data.}
April 10, 1992
Dear Professor Hartshorne,
Last December I wrote to say I had been invited to write an article on your life
and thought for a Dictionary of Literary Biography volume on American philosophers
since 1900. I have enclosed a copy of the article. It is much longer than the editor
requested, although he has given me some freedom as to length. I decided that the length
of the article should be decided by your importance and not by an editor’s estimated word
count. I hope the editor will believe, as much as I do, that nothing I have written should
be omitted. If you think it can be improved in some way please let me know.
Can you please supply me with the following information?
{1870? —your mother’s dates?36
1960}
—important recent publications or planned publications of your work? (I have
copies of the article on Hegel in CLIO and the open letter to Carl Sagan).
—whether “Thinking About Thinking Machines” was reprinted somewhere?
{No, a man trained in physics talks about bringing it up to date in its physics but
nothing comes so far.}
—whether your review of Sein und Zeit was the first English review of that
book?37 I haven’t found any earlier review, but I’ve asked a friend who knows
Continental philosophy if he knows of one. {I know of nothing.}
Here’s hoping that you and yours are doing well.

36

Marguerite Haughton Hartshorne (1868-1959). I eventually obtained the information on
Hartshorne’s mother’s dates by calling his younger brother, the internationally known geographer, Richard
Hartshorne (1899-1992), who lived in Madison, Wisconsin. I discovered that Richard was more well
organized than Charles when it came to family matters. See my letter of December 14, 1991.
37
Sein und Zeit by Martin Heidegger was published in 1927. It was first translated into English as
Being and Time in 1962 by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Hartshorne’s review, which was
indeed the first English language review, was published in Philosophical Review 38, 3 (May 1929): 284293.
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Fond Regards,
Don Viney
[49] {A book by a friend, Mohammad Valady & me is done but we haven’t found a
publisher. He puts brief questions (very good ones & I answer fairly briefly). This is c.
[about] 1/3 of the book. The rest is some essays either published only in a journal or not
published, a few written recently. Title: Points of View and Other Essays. He modestly
calls himself editor, he’s more than that and writes a nice introduction. He’s a very bright
Ph.D. here. He was never in a class of mine. I was Emeritus when he came.}
[On the table of contents for the book referred to above, Hartshorne wrote:] {Publisher
not yet decided. Perhaps this is not relevant. My plan is to try UT Press [University of
Texas]. Essays being published in ’92. 1) “Fifty Years of Aesthetics,” for J. of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism. Fiftieth Anniversary of the Soc. for Aesthetics. I was one of the
founders. 2) “Metaphysics as Foundation,” in Essays in Honor of Ivor Leclerc. SUNY,
’92.}38
*

*

*

[In the following, Hartshorne is responding to my lengthy article, “The Life and Thought
of Charles Hartshorne,” written for The Dictionary of Literary Biography.]
April [21], 1992
Dear Don,
How can I adequately express my pleasure in your beautifully readable and
faithfully accurate account. You put things sometimes better than I have or now could put
them. I’ve forgotten the destination of your essay? It should help a lot of people to know
what my thought amounts to and how it came about.
There is one important discovery of mine that, much more by my mistakes than
yours, is missing in your account. I enclose an example. It is not found in the right form
in any of my books and in few articles published either. I enclose a copy. Only since my
90th birthday have I had this 4 column, 4 row arrangement, and any other is poor, as a
mathematician would have told me.39 The one who did tell me was a theologian at
Colorado College [Joseph [50] Pickle], whither I went three times to do my last teaching.
With this diagram, in Peirce’s sense, I can give by far the strongest arguments ever not
only for theism but for a definite form of theism, the one Whitehead and Peirce were
The correct bibliographical information is as follows: “Reminiscences of Charles Hartshorne
(member since 1942).” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 (Spring 1993): 286-289. The second
article is “God, Necessary and Contingent; World, Contingent and Necessary; and the Fifteen Other
Options in Thinking about God: Necessity and Contingency as Applied to God and the World.”
Metaphysics as Foundations: Essays in Honor of Ivor Leclerc, eds. Paul A. Bogaard and Gordan Treash
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993): 296-311.
39
See Appendix I for the 4 X 4 matrix and a brief discussion of the four reasons Hartshorne
mentions in this letter.
38
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seeking but failing to find. Why did I find it? Mostly luck, Peirce to edit, and at the same
time told to help Whitehead in grading papers of his students so I had to listen to his
lectures and get to know him, visiting his summer cottage in New Hampshire (or was it
Vermont?) The one right of the 16 options is the intersection of 3 “lines”, the third row,
the third column, and the diagonal N.n, C.c, NC.nc (or cn, that’s the same combination
though a different permutation, which is not being counted as a different option, though it
symbolizes that capital letters and lower cases, though modally the same have the
difference that categories as applied to God are both the same and not the same, the
likeness and the differences being equally definite, and a matter of principle). Well, for
each of the three lines intersecting there is a logical reason for preferring them to any
line. In addition, there is a fourth reason for preference. The last item on the diagonal, the
double zero, is the least plausible item in the diagram and it and NC.cn are logical
contradictories not logical contraries, of each other. Whichever of the two is false the
other must be true. To prefer the double zero is to vote with the negativism of classical
theism that ruined theology for the modern world. The famous theologia negativa was a
worship of negation, which, looked at coldly, appears as blasphemous and an outright
contradiction in a religion based on love. Love is the most positive thing there can be.
Who were responsible for this absurdity? Aristotle and Plotinus, the two neoplatonists
who hid the actual Plato behind their own worship of false gods, mere unity and mere
self-sufficiency, immutability, and unlovingness. Genuine unity is through love, not in
spite of it.
Cheers!
C. H.
[Hartshorne reread my account of his life and thought in early December 1992 and sent
me another letter concerning it, offering suggestions that saved me from a couple of
mistakes.]
[Postmark December 10, 1992]
Dear Don,
I came across your wonderful essay of 47 pages on my career. It is superb, and
I’m immodest enough to think it only slightly overrates me. Except for page 9, I find no
flaws anywhere, and perhaps at least one of the two on that page have been corrected. If
X prehends Y and Y does not prehend X this means that X succeeds (not precedes) Y.
The other flaw, as I see it, is when in it is said that in perception we prehend the
(circumambient) actualities. This is [51] at least misleading, for the most direct and
definite data are inner-bodily, according to me and Whitehead as well. As [Maurice]
Merleau-Ponty says, we experience the world through the flesh (really the bodily cells in
the central nervous system).
The last time we talked on the phone your voice at one point sounded sad, as
though you felt troubled by something I said, or did not say, and I wondered what that
was.
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I’ve finally learned to use my SCM Processor rather well. I still have no serious
illnesses; moderately deaf on high pitches makes trouble in trying to talk with some
women on the phone, especially if they talk fast as well as high; also with amateur
women speakers in the UU church [Unitarian Universalist] here. Amateur public speakers
almost invariably talk too fast, they read or memorize their talk and rattle it off.
My M.D. says I should reach 100. I think he’s proud of my longevity. He once
described me as a “Delightful gentleman” when calling to the nearby hospital when I was
anemic, years ago. He is very much a Christian, I’ve no idea what he knows of my
religious views, but he has conservative religious pamphlets for patients to read while
waiting to see him. He probably votes republican. I’m delighted the [Ronald] Reagan era
is over and see a fair chance for [Bill] Clinton to be a great president, though the times
are frightening. The evil empire’s collapse shifts the danger, but other would-be
imperialists are still around and the Reagan-Bush fascination with unuseable weapons has
almost bankrupt the nation. Also the world is dismally over-crowded. Only young people
can have the hope and energy that is needed.
My two perhaps last books, one philosophy, the other ornithology, are about in
final shape but publication is not yet arranged. Born to Sing is reissued, paperback edition
at a fairly low price. The same (University of Indiana) press will consider publishing it
[the new book]. Title: Why Study Birds? And Other Essays: by a Lover of Nature and
Those Who Study Her. I think I wrote you about the other more philosophical book. It
just might turn out to be the best book introduction to my total set of ideas. The best
essay introduction looks like yours.
Hoping you and yours are flourishing.
C. H.
[Handwrittten] What’s the present (or final) state or status of your glorious account of my
stuff & process?
*

*

*

[52] December 14, 1992
Dear Professor Hartshorne,
Your comments on my lengthy article on your thought are most welcome. I have
made the changes that you suggest. I have only one minor disagreement with you. You
say that my article only slightly overrates you. I thought that I estimated your importance
accurately!
The article will appear in the volume of the Dictionary of Literary Biography
devoted to “American Philosophers Since 1990.” The book will be illustrated. I sent the
publishers the best pictures that I have taken of you over the past decade. The editor has
been unable to give me a definite date of publication. As soon as I learn anything I’ll let
you know.
I will see my father this Christmas and help him to celebrate the publication of his
book, A History of Psychology: Ideas and Context. I have not seen the book yet but Dad
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tells me that he mentions your views about sensation. I also look forward to seeing your
next books, the one on birds and the other edited by—I think you said—M. Valady.
You mention in your letter that when we talked on the telephone last April, I
sounded as though I felt troubled by something you said. It’s been so long I don’t recall.
However, you gave me Richard’s number in Wisconsin and, after talking with you, I
called him. He had precise information on your parents’ dates which I needed for the
article. He also volunteered some anecdotes about your mother. Here’s the story I
particularly liked: When she was 91, Richard took her out to eat. His aunt warned
Richard that his mother ate slowly. Sure enough, when others had finished, Marguerite
was still eating. She apologized for eating so slowly and said that it was a problem she
was working on. She must have been a marvelous woman with a fine sense of humor.
A few days ago I learned of Richard’s death in October (a colleague showed me a
notice in the Association of American Geographers Newsletter). I was saddened by the
news but am happy that I had the chance to meet him, if only in a telephone conversation.
I have been awarded a sabbatical leave for the Spring semester of 1994. My plan
is to travel to Bretagne to visit Lequier’s old haunts and follow up some of my work on
his thought. The most serious obstacle I face at this point is finding the money to finance
the trip.
It is good to hear that you are in such good health. I imagine that you have a lot of
philosophizing left in you.
Fond Regards,
Don
[53] P. S. I am enclosing my review of God, Values, and Empiricism (Peden & Axel,
eds.) in which I mention the empirical dimensions of your thought.
*

*

*

[On May 15, 1993 I sent Hartshorne the proofs of his paper “Can Philosophers Cooperate
Intellectually: Metaphysics as Applied Mathematics” with corrections that I had marked
and asked that he look them over. He returned the stamped and addressed postcard I had
enclosed in the envelope with a couple of changes. He closed with “I’m in good shape!!”
The last letter I received from Hartshorne was on April 2, 1995 and it is handwritten, but
very legible.]
April 2, 1995
Dear Donald,
How are you?
I’ve just found pp. 109-112 of the MWQU 35, 1, 1993 & had some good laughs.40

40

The pages Hartshorne refers to contain reviews of two books, Ring Lardner and the Other by
Douglas Robinson, reviewed by Charles Cagle and my review of LLP volume, The Philosophy of Charles
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I now walk almost normally indoors & well enough outdoors with a 4-footed cane
to balance me. My broken hip seems healed. Open Court is slow but Points of View &
Other Essays is to come out in 1996, perhaps about a year from now, by me and
Mohammad Valady. I’ve done 2 essays recently, & feel that’s about it.
I can still think, but it takes more time & only my SCM word processor makes it
possible. Typing no longer possible. Too many mistakes, clumsy fingers.
Donald R. Griffin & David Ray Griffin are 2 of my heroes now, Donald on
animals, David on MT (Modern Thought) as self-destructive, Descartes to Kant.
Charles H.
[I sent Hartshorne three more letters. On April 8, 1995 I updated him on my work on my
biography of Jules Lequyer and my translation of his works. I also told him about Anita
Chancey’s paper on his views on abortion and I sent him a copy of an article about my
and Rebecca’s trip to France to pursue the trail of Lequyer.41 On April 21, 1997 I sent
Hartshorne my review of Zero Fallacy. My last letter was the only one in which I
addressed him by his first name.]
[54] June 4, 1997
Dear Charles,
Happy Birthday! I’d wish you good luck, but you already seem to be fortune’s
beneficiary. In celebration of your centenary I offer my summary of your achievements in
this booklet.42 I thank you for all of the richness you have added to my life and the lives
of those to whom I have communicated your ideas.
Fond Regards,
Don
[I saw Hartshorne one more time, on October 10, 1997 at the celebration of his centenary
in Austin, Texas. Robert Kane had invited me to Austin to participate in the celebration

Hartshorne. Cagle’s review is indeed humorous, in a devastating way; my review is only mildly humorous
at one point.
41
My biography of Lequyer was published in Jules Lequyer’s Abel and Abel followed by Incidents
in the Life and Death of Jules Lequyer (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999): 107-190. Anita Miller
Chancey, my former student, published “Rationality, Contributionism, and the Value of Love: Hartshorne
on Abortion,” in Process Studies 28, 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1999): 85-97. The article I sent to Hartshorne is
“On the Trail of a French Philosopher of Genius: Jules Lequyer,” published in Pittsburg State University
Magazine, 6, 1 (Winter 1995): 12-14.
42
The Life and Thought of Charles Hartshorne (Pittsburg, Kansas: Logos-Sophia Press, 1997).
This is a self-published version of the paper that appears in the Dictionary of Literary Biography volume on
American Philosophers Since 1900 (forthcoming in 2002). [The book was finally published as American
Philosophers Before 1950. In Dictionary of Literary Biography, volume 270, Philip B. Dematteis and
Leemon B. McHenry, eds. (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2003). The essay on Hartshorne is on pp. 129-151.]
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and to present a paper in Hartshorne’s honor. My paper, presented on October 11th, was
titled “Charles Hartshorne and the Openness of God.”43]
Charles Hartshorne died on October 9, 2000 at his home in Austin, Texas at the age of
103. On that day I was serving as cantor for Yom Kippur services at the temple in Joplin,
Missouri.

43

Papers from the centenary celebration at Austin are published in The Personalist Forum 14, 2
(Fall 1998), guest editor William T. Myers.
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[55] Appendix I: The Table of Sixteen Options and Neoclassical Theism
In his letter of April 21, 1992 Hartshorne mentions a 4 column, 4 row table of
options for thinking about God and the world. All of the options listed in the table are
stated as early as Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (1970); however, as
Hartshorne says, it was not until after his 90th birthday (in 1987) that he hit upon the 4 X
4 arrangement, with the help of his friend at Colorado College, Joseph Pickle.
The purpose of the table is to apply a pair of metaphysical contrasts to God and
the world (in this case, necessity and contingency) and display all logically possible
permutations. Upper case letters are used for divine modalities of necessity and
contingency (N, C) while lower case letters are used for worldly modalities of necessity
and contingency (n, c). In his earliest presentations of the options and of the table the
zeros denoted nonexistence. In later presentations the zeros are, in Hartshorne’s words,
“interpreted broadly” to mean either impossibility or having no modal status.
The reversal of the order—NC as opposed to cn—is meant as a reminder of the
contrast between N and n: the necessity of God’s existence is the necessity of an
individual, whereas the necessity of the world is the necessity that the set of non-divine
individuals not be empty.

I. God wholly
necessary

II God wholly
contingent

III God necessary
and contingent in
different respects

1. World wholly
necessary

N.n

C.n

NC.n

O.n

2. World wholly
contingent

N.c

C.c

NC.c

O.c

N.cn

C.cn

NC.cn

O.cn

N.o

C.o

NC.o

Necessity and
Contingency as
Applied to God
and the World

3. World
contingent and
necessary in
different respects

4. World
impossible or no
modal status

IV. God
impossible or no
modal status

O.o
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[56] Hartshorne considered the table to “furnish a genuinely new argument for my
neoclassical theism, nor is there anything like it for any other theism” (Zero Fallacy, 83).
In brief, the “new argument” involves, at a minimum, the following: (1) NC.cn includes
all that is positive in rows I and II and lines 1 and 2; Hartshorne argues that the most
general conceptions cannot lack instantiation and that both sides of the necessity and
contingency contrast should be retained. (2) NC.cn, like the other alternatives on the
diagonal from N.n to O.o, allows for an experiential basis for God-talk. (3) O.o is the
most false view and NC.cn is the most removed from it and hence is most true (Zero
Fallacy, 83-84). Hartshorne considered his six theistic arguments to play a supporting
role in the “new argument” (“God, Necessary and Contingent” 308)—for instance, the
design argument shows up problems in O.cn. A full exposition of the argument would
surely involve careful attention to the meaning of the zeros.
Hartshorne was justly proud of this table, for it an elegant summary of much of
what he took himself to have accomplished in his pursuit of metaphysical understanding.
From the time of Man’s Vision of God (1941), he complained that discussions in
philosophical theology lacked logical rigor. They failed to distinguish the varieties of
ways of conceptualizing God and thereby committed the fallacy of many questions.
Hartshorne’s table shows that the disjunction “theism or atheism” or the slightly more
sophisticated “traditional theism, pantheism, or atheism” are far from exhaustive. To be
sure, one may locate the standard options on Hartshorne’s matrix: Thomistic theism
(N.c); Stoic or Spinozistic pantheism (N.n); and d’Holbach’s atheism (O.n). The table
also invites one to pair up other formally stated positions with what philosophers and
theologians have actually believed. One may find Sartrean atheism (O.cn) or extreme or
acosmic Advaita Vedanta (N.o); there remain a variety of theistic perspectives:
Aristotle’s (N.cn), John Stuart Mill’s (C.n), William James’ (C.c) Jules Lequyer’s (NC.c),
and Hartshorne’s (NC.cn).
At times, Hartshorne would point out that each of the sixteen options has two
subdivisions, depending on whether one accepts or rejects Plato’s World-Soul analogy
for God (cf. Zero Fallacy, 83). For example, NC.cn describes the views of both
Whitehead and Hartshorne, but only Hartshorne accepts Plato’s analogy. This brings the
total options to thirty-two. There are, however, far more formal [57] options than this. As
Hartshorne notes, comparable tables can be constructed for any pair of metaphysical
contrasts, such as infinite/finite or eternal/temporal (Hartshorne denies that the
mind/body distinction is a metaphysical contrast). For any pair of metaphysical contrasts
there is a 4 X 4 table (= 16), and hence, for any two pair in conjunction, the number of
formal alternatives is 16 X 16 (= 256). To generalize, if n equals the number of pairs of
contrasts to be included, the number of formal options is 16n (or 16n x 2 to include those
accepting and those rejecting the World-Soul analogy).
An important way in which the table summarizes Hartshorne’s contribution to
philosophical reflection on the meaning of “God” is illustrated in the third column. God
is characterized as, in different respects, necessary and contingent. This idea runs counter
to the regnant tradition of Western theology. Philosophers of the medieval period, taking
their hint from Plato (Republic, Bk 2), Aristotle (Physics, Bk 8 and Metaphysics, Bk 12),
and a few passages of Scripture (Num. 23.19; Mal. 3.6; Jas. 1.17) denied of perfection
any contingent attributes. The most perspicuous expression of this idea of deity is
Thomas’ declaration that “the creatures are really related to God” but “in God there is no
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real relation to creatures . . .” (Summa Theologica I, Q 13, a.7). For Thomas, there are no
contingent aspects of God, in part because nothing the creatures could do could have any
effect on God (the denial of contingency in God also implies that God is not self-changed
in any way). The great reformers, Martin Luther and John Calvin, agreed in this denial, as
did most philosophers of the modern period, from Descartes to Kant. Hence, the only
theism taken very seriously was under the first column—God wholly necessary. This
group of views, related with conceptual ties stronger than what Wittgenstein called
family resemblance, can without exaggeration be called “classical theism.”
So weighty was this tradition that any suggestion that the divine might be other
than how classical theism conceived it to be was treated as a changing of the subject.
Hartshorne challenged this attitude in three ways. First, he reminded philosophers that,
whether one surveys intellectual history or one engages in a formal analysis of theistic
options (as in the 4 X 4 table), there is no single theistic view. Second, he pointed out the
logical problems in classical theism. Finally, he demonstrated how it is possible to
conceive God as, in different respects, necessary and contingent. Generalized to apply to
[58] any pair of metaphysical contrasts, this is Hartshorne’s doctrine of dual
transcendence. God is eminently, but in different respects, necessary and contingent,
infinite and finite, absolute and relative, being and becoming, cause and effect, and so on.
When he was accused of denying God’s transcendence he would reply that he believed in
twice as much transcendence as others.
Hartshorne noted that there is no contradiction in the NC option if God is not
necessary and contingent in the same respect. He distinguished different logical levels at
which metaphysical contraries apply to God. He drew a three-fold distinction among
essence (the most abstract feature of what a thing is), existence (the fact that a thing is),
and actuality (the particular characteristics that qualify an existing thing). For example,
“That I shall (at least probably) exist tomorrow is one thing; that I shall exist hearing a
blue jay call at noon is another” (Logic of Perfection, 63). The difference between the
speaker and God is that God’s continued existence is not merely probable. The speaker’s
existence is contingent whereas God’s is necessary. However, the experience of hearing a
blue jay at noon is as contingent for the speaker as it is for God (or alternately, God’s
knowledge that the speaker hears a blue jay at noon is contingent). Moreover, in the
divine case, essence (what God is) and existence (that God is) are the same. Thus,
Hartshorne usually spoke of the distinction between existence and actuality. Hartshorne
summarized the case in this way: “That God exists is one with his essence and is an
analytic truth . . . but how, or in what actual state of experience or knowledge or will, he
exists is contingent in the same sense as is our own existence” (Divine Relativity 87).
The distinction between existence and actuality, more than any other, is at the
foundation of Hartshorne’s neoclassical or dipolar theism. David Tracy referred to the
distinction as “Hartshorne’s discovery” (Tracy 259) and Hartshorne remarked that he
hoped to be remembered for it (Cobb and Gamwell 74). The distinction allows
Hartshorne to preserve the best insights of classical theism while remedying its greatest
oversights. For example, the existence and the essence (Hartshorne sometimes says
character) of God are, in Hartshorne’s view, necessary, immutable, independent, eternal,
and infinite; but the actuality of God is contingent, mutable, dependent, temporal and
finite. Hartshorne’s theory allows one to say, without contradiction, that God is perfect in
love, knowledge, and power and [59] that God’s love, knowledge, and power are

56
constantly changing to respond in perfect ways to the decisions of the creatures and
worldly processes. The idea of a change in God was anathema to classical theists because
it was viewed as a kind of metaphysical virus that infects the whole of the divine reality;
if God is in any sense contingent, then the very existence of God is contingent. Thomas is
very clear on this point (Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk I, 16.2). Thus, Thomas persists in
thinking of God in Aristotelian categories (customized to Christian beliefs) as the
unmoved mover (Summa Theologica I, Q 2, art. 3). Hartshorne teaches one to think of
God as “the most and best moved mover” (Zero 6, 39).
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[60] Appendix II: Sample Letter from Hartshorne
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[61] Appendix III: Hartshorne Memorial Statement
I knew Charles Hartshorne for the last two decades of his life. One does not easily
forget a meeting with him: the smiling eyes behind wire-rimmed glasses; the disheveled
eyebrows; the beak-like nose; the voice, pitched high with age, cracking with excitement
at some philosophical insight; the contagious sense of self-importance tempered by
humility before the genius of a Plato, Peirce, or Whitehead (or a musician); the witty
anecdotes; the fondness for birds; the blink and nod that bade a charming farewell. His
small frame and his mail order clothes only served to bring into disarming relief that one
was conversing with a surviving member of the pantheon of twentieth century
philosophers.
Never content to philosophize ahistorically, he self-consciously wove threads
from the masters of the past into the tapestry of his own neoclassical metaphysics, often
discovering, in the process, unfamiliar insights of great thinkers and great insights of
unfamiliar thinkers. He once told me that he sometimes did philosophy by imagining
himself conversing with the giants of the past. Perhaps this was only natural for someone
who had actually conversed with Lewis, Husserl, Heidegger, Whitehead, Russell, Carnap,
and many other philosophical titans of his own time. Reading Hartshorne's books, one is
able to participate vicariously in that lively conversation. That Hartshorne found no
dichotomy between philosophy and its history is a credit to his unique genius. That he
articulated a vision of things that, despite its shortcomings (of which he was aware), is
often rigorous enough to meet the demands of reason and rich enough to satisfy our
emotional nature qualifies him as one of the greatest metaphysicians—perhaps the
greatest—of his century. My favorite description of Hartshorne is from John B. Cobb Jr.
who called him "a strange and alien greatness."
Time will tell whether I exaggerate, but I wish in this brief memorial only to
celebrate the man to whom I and others owe so much. The last time I saw Hartshorne
present a paper was at the Center for Process Studies in September 1991 at a conference
given in honor of his achievements. He used an overhead projector to display a couple of
diagrams and charts. At one point he became tangled in the electric cords and Marjorie
Suchocki had to come to his aid. He stood directly between the projector and the screen
and pointed at the screen [62] as he spoke. This was all quite entertaining and somehow
appropriate. After all, we had come not only to honor his ideas but to honor the man, and
if this day the man eclipsed the ideas it was only fitting.
Donald Wayne Viney
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Charles Hartshorne
September 29, 1991
Claremont, California
[Photo by Donald Viney]

Charles Hartshorne
September 29, 1991
Claremont, California
[Marjorie Suchocki in foreground]
[Photo by Donald Viney]
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Wayne Viney and Charles Hartshorne
April 2, 1983
Atlanta, Georgia
[Photo by Donald Viney]

Charles Hartshorne and Donald Viney
February 23, 1981
Norman, Oklahoma
[Photo by Jerry Klingaman]
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Back cover material:
In April 1987, a small group of students from Pittsburg State University accompanied
their professor, Donald Viney, to Edmond, Oklahoma, to hear Charles Hartshorne speak.
As a result of that fieldtrip, the Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society was born.
This issue of Logos-Sophia commemorates that event by publishing the correspondence
between Hartshorne and Viney.
Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000) was the foremost representative of process philosophy in
the latter half of the twentieth century. In hundreds of publications spanning the better
part of seven decades, Hartshorne made major contributions to philosophy and theology
and, to a lesser but not insignificant degree, to psychology and ornithology.
Donald Wayne Viney (b. 1953) is Professor of Philosophy at Pittsburg State University in
Pittsburg, Kansas, where he joined the faculty in 1984.

